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I
n our previous report, Rethinking Central Bank-
ing, we made the case for a broader mandate for 
central banks and for monetary policy coordina-
tion. In this report, we lay out a complementary 
framework for cross-border banking flows and for 
improved regulatory coordination. 
The traditional policy prescription for capital ac-
count opening is that the benefits of capital flows 
can be reaped by removing the impediments to 
unfettered capital movements one by one. Some 
allowance is made for emerging and developing 
economies to liberalize more slowly, given their 
weak institutions. However recent experience, 
such as the capital flow reversals in Europe, has 
shown that even advanced economies may be vul-
nerable to the unintended consequences of capital 
account liberalization when the procyclicality in-
herent in capital flows is not adequately addressed. 
The procyclicality of capital flows can in principle 
be addressed through coordinated global regula-
tion and globally coordinated monetary policy. 
However, in practice such coordination is not 
straightforward to design or implement, even 
when the interests of countries overlap or are con-
gruent. And even when coordination is globally 
optimal, it may generate tensions with the valued 
prerogative of national governance. 
Given the obstacles to global coordination, coun-
tries may have little choice but to design frame-
works that mitigate the risks of cross-border flows 
at the national level. We provide a number of rec-
ommendations from the perspective of national 
policy makers. 
Executive Summary
Our main conclusions and recommendations are 
as follows:
•	 The policy maker’s goal is to reap the ben-
efits from cross-border capital flows while 
guarding against potential financial stabil-
ity costs. Reaping the benefits requires, 
first and foremost, resisting vested inter-
ests that push for barriers to capital flows 
as a way of avoiding necessary structural 
reforms and fiscal adjustments. Good 
macroeconomic and structural policies 
form the bedrock of financial stability. 
•	 Guarding against financial instabil-
ity starts with keeping track of the com-
plete matrix of gross cross-border capital 
flows and gross external asset and liabil-
ity positions. Focusing on net flows is not 
enough. The detailed features of national 
balance sheets, at the level of gross flows, 
determine whether financial integration 
promotes risk sharing across countries or 
increases financial contagion.
•	 Persistent current account imbalances 
pose financial stability risks and have 
implications for the sustainability of net 
external asset positions. Discussions of 
global rebalancing should be linked to the 
broader debate on capital flows, including 
specifically the connections between capi-
tal flows and financial stability, the procy-
clical nature of such flows, and the role of 
monetary policy spillovers in magnifying 
that procyclicality.
•	 Foreign direct investment and equity 
portfolio investment are conducive to 
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increased international risk sharing and 
tend to be stabilizing. In contrast, credit 
flows, which are not always conducive to 
efficient risk sharing, have a greater poten-
tial to be destabilizing. Therefore, current 
biases in favor of debt financing over eq-
uity financing should be reduced.
•	 Most cross-border capital flows are chan-
neled through global banks and are heav-
ily procyclical. The procyclical nature of 
cross-border bank-intermediated credit 
flows has given rise to serious economic 
and financial instabilities. Effective regu-
lation of cross-border banking is essential 
for domestic and global financial stability 
in a highly financially integrated world 
economy.
•	 The organizational and financial struc-
ture of global banks is important for the 
transmission of imbalances and there-
fore requires careful regulatory attention. 
Banks that are funded by stable deposits 
or long-term funding pose the least risk. 
In contrast, banks that rely on short-term 
wholesale funding represent a greater risk, 
irrespective of whether they are domesti-
cally-owned or branches/subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. 
•	 Globally-enforced financial regulation 
together with global monetary policy co-
ordination can reduce distortions suffi-
ciently to allow countries to reap the ben-
efits of capital flows while limiting risks to 
stability. In practice, though, political re-
alities are likely to complicate multilateral 
discussions of banking regulation, while 
monetary policy tends to be conducted 
with domestic rather than global impera-
tives in mind.
•	 The incremental liberalization of capital 
flows in the pursuit of the ideal of the fric-
tionless First Best outcome has not worked 
as advertised. The crisis in the euro area 
shows that the flaws with the incremental 
First Best approach are not simply a result 
of underdeveloped or inadequate domes-
tic institutions, as traditionally argued 
in the emerging market and developing 
country context.
•	 Given the difficulties of attaining a uni-
fied global regulatory framework and ef-
ficiently coordinating monetary policies 
across countries, governments may need 
to resort to a Second Best approach in 
which they seek actively to manage capi-
tal flows. Macro-prudential policies can 
play a key role in this process by imposing 
targeted regulations on banks engaged in 
cross-border activities. 
•	 Macro-prudential policies should operate 
on the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet, 
as do loan-to-value and debt-to-income 
caps, and the liability side, through devic-
es such as levies on the non-core liabilities. 
These policies should attempt to influ-
ence balance sheet management by banks 
through instruments like countercyclical 
capital requirements. 
•	 For the euro area, the First Best outcome 
may still be attainable through sufficiently 
robust financial regulation together with 
banking integration. A full banking union 
with a single regulator, as has been pro-
posed recently by the European Commis-
sion, would be an effective means to this 
end. Alternatively, national banking sys-
tems that are conservatively regulated at 
the national level—for instance, through 
macro-prudential measures that limit 
banks’ reliance on short-term wholesale 
funding—would help moderate capital 
flows that could otherwise exacerbate 
procyclical behavior and generate risks. 
But the middle ground of fragmented fi-
nancial systems with unimpeded capital 
flows has been shown by recent events to 
be untenable. 
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T
he world has become more integrated, not just 
through trade but through financial flows. Fi-
nancial integration offers many benefits but 
also poses risks. This observation in turn points to 
the question of how best to benefit from greater 
financial integration while limiting adverse ef-
fects. A complicating factor in improving the ben-
efit-cost tradeoff from financial integration is that 
banks often play a central role in intermediating 
these flows. Banks behave in ways that differ from 
those predicted by textbooks of atomistic partici-
pants in financial markets. In addition, they are 
subject to uncoordinated regulatory and political 
forces that are and hard to predict. 
In this report, we draw on the growing body of evi-
dence on cross-border capital flows in an effort to 
better understand their effects in practice. Building 
on this analysis, we suggest ways in which policy 
should be adapted to reap the benefits of the flows 
while minimizing their costs. While bank flows 
cannot be studied in isolation, our analysis and 
policy recommendations focus on banks, as they 
intermediate a substantial fraction of cross-border 
capital flows, are highly volatile, and pose specific 
regulatory and policy challenges. 
The textbook case for financial integration is well 
known. It allows capital to flow from capital-rich 
to capital-poor economies, where returns should 
be higher. These flows complement limited do-
mestic saving in capital-poor countries and reduce 
their cost of capital, thus boosting investment and 
growth. Financial integration can also help cush-
ion the impact of adverse shocks, since consump-
tion can be smoothed by external borrowing even 
if incomes are volatile, while capital flows can help 
to sustain investment. Financial integration can 
provide risk diversification by allowing residents 
to transfer domestic risks to foreign investors 
while gaining exposure to foreign investment op-
portunities.
In addition, financial flows may have “collateral” or 
indirect benefits. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
can bring new technologies, along with managerial 
and organizational expertise, to the receiving coun-
try. International investors tend to demand more 
transparency and better governance of local firms. 
By providing risk-bearing capital, financial integra-
tion can help domestic firms specialize, fostering 
faster productivity growth. Monitoring by interna-
tional investors can discipline macroeconomic poli-
cies, encouraging governments to pursue sustain-
able fiscal policies and enlightened prudential strat-
egies. These indirect benefits of financial openness 
thus promise faster economic growth.
Even diehard proponents of liberalized, open 
financial markets make some allowance for a 
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
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slower pace of financial integration for developing 
or emerging economies, citing their weaker insti-
tutions and more limited capacity to absorb and 
benefit fully from the inflows of capital.1 In their 
view, however, the ideal of full capital account con-
vertibility should still serve as the North Star that 
emerging-economy to which policy makers should 
navigate, even if they must steer close to land ini-
tially so as to avoid the perils of the open ocean that 
only advanced economies can navigate safely.
At the same time, recent events, from the subprime 
crisis in the United States to capital flow reversals 
and the banking crisis in Europe, have shaken 
faith that even advanced economies can harness 
the benefits of greater financial flows and deepen 
financial integration without incurring costs. The 
advanced countries that have been swept up first 
by the subprime crisis and now by the eurozone 
crisis are not the stereotypical emerging econo-
mies with weak institutions. Spain, for example, 
ranks high on traditional yardsticks of financial 
development such as the ratio of commercial bank 
assets to GDP, or of markers of financial integra-
tion such as cross-border liabilities as a proportion 
of GDP. And yet, those same measures of financial 
integration and development that were held up as 
yardsticks of progress have turned out instead to 
be the engines of financial distress as capital flow 
reversals have gathered pace in Europe. In con-
trast, it has been the emerging economies with 
what were presumed to be “weak” institutions and 
underdeveloped financial markets that have best 
weathered the storm. 
These topsy-turvy outcomes have been disorienting 
for those who believed in the desirability of mov-
ing toward the ideal of liberalized, open financial 
markets in incremental steps. In this report, we 
will take stock of the traditional case for financial 
liberalization and offer our perspective on which 
principles have withstood the test of recent events 
and which ones now need rethinking. 
What’s So Special about Cross-Border 
Flows? 
In practice, a sizeable portion of cross-border 
flows is intermediated by the banking sector. 
These are of the wholesale funding variety, much 
of it short term, that is liable to reverse quickly 
when financial conditions deteriorate. Why cross-
border flows tend to be wholesale funding flows 
is an interesting research question in and of itself. 
For the policy maker, the intellectual quest to un-
derstand the reasons may be of less relevance than 
the fact that the underlying causes of the observed 
pattern may be difficult to dislodge, at least in the 
short term.
The border is also relevant as it is associated with 
the boundaries in policy making. When policy 
produces spillovers but coordination is less than 
perfect, the border becomes relevant in assessing 
policy alternatives. Whereas monetary, regulatory, 
and fiscal policies tend to be coordinated within a 
jurisdiction, coordination is more difficult across 
borders. These problems are particularly acute 
with regard to bank flows, which not only account 
for a large proportion of total cross-border flows 
but are also more volatile.2 
Consider bank regulation. Without a global rule-
book, there is the danger that policy measures that 
are in a nation’s interest take priority over the glob-
ally optimal policy measure. For example, national 
1  Clear-cut evidence on the positive effects of financial integration on growth has been elusive, however. Some studies show capital flows are 
beneficial in developing countries provided they have strong institutions and that there are thresholds effects (Prasad et al., 2003, Arteta et al, 
2001). But the survey by Kose et al. (2009) concludes that the cross-country evidence lacks robustness. Prasad et al (2007) and Gourinchas and 
Jeanne (2007) note that emerging market and developing countries that have grown most rapidly did so without much foreign capital. The meta-
analysis of Jeanne et al (2012) points to a threshold effect in which rich country growth rates are positively associated with financial integration 
but notes the lack of clear-cut general evidence.
2  Subsidiarization does not resolve this problem, as the examples of Hungary and other emerging East European countries that are subsidiaries of 
Western European banks show. We return to this issue later in our report.
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regulators in Europe did not force their banks to 
recapitalize but instead allowed them to shed for-
eign assets and withdraw from foreign markets. A 
second example is ring fencing. In this case each 
country attempts to grab the assets of a weak mul-
tinational bank before the other countries and 
thereby endangers a possibly viable bank. Com-
mon ground rules for banking regulation should 
be established to prevent these costs being im-
posed by one county on another. 
The multilateral process governing reform of 
banking regulation led by the G20, Financial Sta-
bility Board (FSB), and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) has shown how diffi-
cult such discussions can be. The negotiations over 
the new Basel III rules on international banking 
started with great fanfare in the aftermath of the 
2008 crisis but soon morphed into a long-running 
set of trade negotiations where delegates felt im-
pelled to be patrons of domestic banking interests. 
In retrospect, some delegates (especially from Eu-
rope) may now feel that their resistance to tougher 
capital requirements in the early stages of the Basel 
III negotiations (when their banks still had access 
to equity markets) may even have been detrimen-
tal to their own domestic public interest, as well as 
holding back better global banking rules.
In addition, the fact that the appropriate pace and 
sequencing of regulation may differ across coun-
tries creates tensions around the negotiating table. 
The different timing in implementation of the Basel 
guidelines across main financial centers (the U.S., 
for example, implemented Basel II more slowly 
than the Europeans) similarly creates distortions 
and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. 
Analogous distortions are also present in the 
conduct of monetary policy. Here, the monetary 
policy of the Federal Reserve takes on particular 
importance given the role of the U.S. dollar as the 
currency that underpins the global banking sys-
tem. Given the political realities that make domes-
tic economic policy paramount in determining a 
country’s monetary strategy, global coordination 
of monetary policy is even further removed from 
the realms of realistic procedural goals than is 
global financial regulation [see our earlier report 
Rethinking Central Banking]. 
First Best vs Second Best
In light of the above discussion, we take a step back 
to consider how we may progress from a set of far-
from-ideal circumstances to a better outcome. 
The First Best approach takes as its ideal the fric-
tionless model of the economy and regards the de-
viations from the frictionless model as sufficiently 
small that policies that eliminate those deviations 
one by one are presumed to take the economy 
closer to the frictionless outcome. 
The First Best approach rests on the premise that 
markets are self-correcting through the virtuous 
circle generated by the stabilizing interactions of 
market signals and the decisions guided by those 
signals. Unwise and misguided policies can be 
removed and other market imperfections can be 
eliminated one by one, after which the market 
mechanism will push the economy to a better out-
come. The views associated with the Washington 
Consensus, or more generally any listing of inde-
pendent guiding principles, would be an example 
of the First Best perspective. 
The Second Best approach, in contrast, rests on a 
more cautious view of the durability, stability, and 
desirability of unfettered capital markets. Because 
it takes distortions as more permanent, it does not 
presume that markets are self-correcting. As a re-
sult of such distortions, the Second Best approach 
allows the possibility that the interaction between 
market signals and decisions guided by those sig-
nals may not generate a stabilizing virtuous circle. 
Thus the Second Best approach rests on a more 
pessimistic view of whether distortions in global 
capital markets and the incentives governing its 
key participants as well as its regulators can be 
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removed or altered materially. As long as these 
distortions are present in global capital markets, 
policy makers might be prudent to take those dis-
tortions as givens and adapt policy accordingly.3
Crucially, the Second Best approach has less faith 
that a piecemeal method of removing one distor-
tion at a time will improve economic outcomes. 
Although regulatory interventions distort the 
working of the market mechanism, they may end 
up neutralizing other deep-seated distortions, so 
that the outcome with two distortions (e.g., procy-
clicality and interventions) may be better than the 
outcome with just one (e.g., procyclicality alone). 
Even if one acknowledges the validity of the Sec-
ond Best approach as an abstract proposition, ex-
tracting specific policy prescriptions is more diffi-
cult. This entails identifying not just impediments 
to frictionless markets (the task of the First Best 
approach) but also establishing how they interact 
and figuring out what combination of interven-
tions will help enhance the net benefits of capital 
flows. This is a harder task, and clearly one subject 
to potential error. But it is the one we must attempt 
insofar as we believe that the frictionless ideal is 
impossible to achieve in short order. 
Our report can be seen as an attempt to shed light 
on the considerations that could be invoked in for-
mulating policy prescriptions by operationalizing 
the Second Best approach. The Second Best ap-
proach will suggest policies that attempt to man-
age capital movements rather than allowing them 
to flow freely. Of course, if the reason that the ben-
efits of financial integration cannot be obtained 
is the lack of policy coordination, then a political 
framework that allows for a better coordination 
and integration of fiscal, prudential, and monetary 
policies should allow the benefits of free capital 
flows to outweigh the stability costs. 
For the euro area, which could be seen as having 
the most favorable conditions for achieving close 
policy coordination, more thoroughgoing integra-
tion of financial systems may be superior to the di-
rect control of flows. Observers may differ in their 
assessments of where the exact boundary beyond 
which full integration is the better route. However, 
the case for full integration as the solution to the 
eurozone crisis can be presented coherently and is 
consistent with arguing for greater fragmentation 
elsewhere. 
Capital Flows in the Euro Area
The euro area already has institutions for conduct-
ing joint monetary policy within its borders. The 
euro area comes closest to replicating the features 
that are generally characteristic of a single sover-
eign jurisdiction. All is not well in Europe, to be 
sure, and the fact that it is experiencing severe 
disruption in cross-border financial flows should 
push us to think harder about how this has hap-
pened. It should also spur us to understand the 
limits of financial integration and what the corre-
sponding policy remedies are. 
The euro area is part of the wider EU where capital 
controls were made illegal with the introduction 
of the Single Market in 1992.4 This provision ap-
plies to capital flows both within the EU and with 
the rest of the world, although some controls are 
still permitted under exceptional circumstances. 
Furthermore, the European single market prohib-
its giving preferential regulatory or tax treatment 
to domestic assets. While French legislation can 
treat euro-denominated assets and dollar-denom-
inated assets differently, it cannot treat French and 
German stocks and bonds differently. Respon-
sibility for bank supervision and resolution re-
mains in national hands (at least so far; plans for a 
3 See Rodrik (2011) for further elaboration on the difference between the First Best and Second Best approaches to capital flows. 
4 There are some limited exceptions provided for in Article 65 of the EU Treaty.
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banking union among euro area members are be-
ing discussed by heads of state and government) 
albeit on the basis of a common rulebook. Bank 
support is monitored by the European Commis-
sion, which can and has intervened to limit dis-
tortions to fair competition. In this sense, the euro 
area could be described as a pure monetary union 
(without a financial union) embedded in a single 
market for financial products. 
Starting in 2009, the euro area has been subject to 
major disruptions of cross-border capital flows, 
amounting to a classic “sudden stop” well known 
in the context of emerging market economies.5 It 
would be fair to say that this abrupt capital flow 
reversal surprised most European policy mak-
ers. Until it happened, conventional wisdom held 
that current account deficits within the monetary 
union would be financed in the same way they are 
financed within a single sovereign jurisdiction. 
How can capital flow reversals take place within 
a monetary union when it does not take place in 
other single sovereign jurisdictions? One can put 
forward three reasons: 
•	 Banks, though increasingly diversified, 
still exhibit home bias. National regulators 
are reluctant to push banks to engage in 
further cross-border diversification, per-
haps because of turf issues or the desire to 
protect domestic economic interests. De-
clining real estate prices and doubts about 
the solvency of the sovereign and private 
agents then give rise to doubts about the 
solvency of the national banks.
•	 Responsibility for resolution of failed 
banks still resides at the national level. 
Consequently the creditworthiness of the 
sovereign is directly affected by concerns 
about the solvency of banks in its jurisdic-
tion. Some bank balance-sheets are over-
sized relative to the fiscal capacity of the 
sovereign. Moreover, banks hold a sub-
stantial quantity of sovereign bonds issued 
by their governments. Through the inter-
action of these various factors, domestic 
bank solvency and sovereign solvency are 
linked. 
•	 Since there is no credible fiscal oversight 
within the euro area, a country’s govern-
ment could overspend if its debt were 
commonly guaranteed by the entire euro 
area. This makes market discipline nec-
essary—that is, fiscal spending has to be 
disciplined by the possibility of debt de-
fault. For this reason, the European Cen-
tral Bank’s mandate precludes purchasing 
sovereign debt in the primary market and 
the ECB has (until very recently) been re-
luctant to purchase large amounts of sov-
ereign debt in the secondary market. 
Despite the consequent scope for sudden stops 
within the euro area, Europe’s monetary union can 
nonetheless be seen as the ideal case study for full 
integration as the optimal treatment of interna-
tional capital flows. It represents perhaps the most 
favorable environment in which the First Best per-
spective of a fully integrated financial system may 
be a guide for policy. An analogy would be the fi-
nancial development of the United States and how 
it overcame the borders between individual states. 
Much therefore hangs on the success or failure of 
the European policy response. If the First Best ap-
proach fails in the euro area, it is likely to be inap-
propriate in other settings where the preconditions 
are less favorable. 
With this as preamble, let us turn now to examin-
ing key aspects of capital flows. 
5 See Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) for the parallels between the capital flow reversals in the Euro area and emerging economy “sudden stops”. 
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CHAPTER 2
Some Key Features of Capital Flows
W
e start this section by arguing that gross as 
well as net foreign exposures matter from a 
financial stability perspective. Next, we dif-
ferentiate between different types of capital flows 
and argue that the propensity of banks to make 
lending decisions that accentuate the business cy-
cle—procyclical behavior—is a destabilizing force 
that undermines the self-correcting tendencies of 
the markets. The next section then studies how 
banks’ funding models further accentuate procy-
clicality. We pay particular attention to wholesale 
funding, which is the dominant form of funding 
in the international context. We then consider dif-
ferent organizational forms of cross-border bank-
ing in order to understand whether any of them 
can mitigate these effects. We discuss the roles of 
valuation effects, international balance sheet ef-
fects, flights to safety, and dollar shortages. Finally, 
we summarize the research on how exchange rates 
and capital flows interact.
Gross Flows and Net Flows
Capital flows are traditionally viewed as the finan-
cial counterpart to savings and investment deci-
sions, in line with the narrative of capital flowing 
“downhill” from capital-rich countries with lower 
rates of return to capital-poor countries with high-
er returns. From this perspective, the focus is typi-
cally on net capital flows, since that is what counts 
for funding a country’s borrowing requirements. 
However, a distinguishing feature of the recent pe-
riod has been the rapid increase in gross flows that 
do not always show up in the net capital flow statis-
tics. For most countries, net capital flows are small 
relative to GDP, whereas gross capital flows were 
above twenty percent of GDP for the advanced 
economies and about ten percent for emerging 
economies in the mid-2000s.6 International bank-
ing has been at the heart of the expansion in gross 
flows, with many cross-border banking activities 
involving an expansion in the levels of both for-
eign assets and foreign liabilities. 
The distinction between gross and net flows is il-
lustrated by the experience of the United States. 
Figure 1 shows several categories of capital flows. 
Positive quantities (and bars) indicate gross capital 
inflows (the increase in claims of foreigners on the 
United States), while negative quantities indicate 
gross capital outflows (the increase in the claims of 
U.S. residents on foreigners). 
6  A growing recent literature emphasizes gross capital flows, including Borio and Disyatat (2011), Forbes and Warnock (2011), Obstfeld (2012a, 
2012b), Lane (2012), Shin (2012), and Shularick and Taylor (2012).
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The grey shaded bars indicate the increase in 
claims of official creditors to the United States. 
This includes the increase in claims of China and 
other current account surplus countries. While of-
ficial flows are large, private sector gross flows are 
larger still. The negative bars before 2008 indicate 
large outflows of capital from the U.S. (principally 
through the banking sector), which then re-enter 
the country through the purchases of non-Trea-
sury securities. We cover this in more detail in Ap-
pendix B, where we highlight the role of European 
global banks in driving such flows.
FIGURE 1: Categories of gross capital flows for the United States 
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The upshot of the pattern of gross flows in Figure 1 
is that European banks played an important role in 
influencing credit conditions in the United States 
by providing U.S. dollar intermediation capacity, 
even though net flows between Europe and the 
U.S. were small. Effectively, European global banks 
sustained the “shadow banking system” in the 
United States by utilizing U.S. dollar funding in the 
wholesale market to lend to U.S. residents through 
the purchase of securitized claims on U.S. borrow-
ers. Money market funds in the United States were 
a particularly important source of wholesale bank 
funding for global banks.7
7 See Shin (2012) for more detailed evidence of such “round-trip” flows of capital from (and back to) the United States via the European banks.
Source: Shin (2012), data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
 BANKS AND CAPITAL FLOWS: POLICY CHALLENGES AND REGULATORY RESPONSES
8
Types of Capital Flows and Procyclicality 
of Banking Flows
Capital flows differ depending on the nature of 
the claim (equity, debt), the maturity (short, long), 
the currency of denomination (domestic, foreign), 
and the nature or control of the investor (portfolio 
investment, foreign direct investment, bank). We 
now ask which kinds of flows cause the greatest 
concern from a stability perspective.
FDI and Equity Portfolio Investments
Typically, aggregate FDI flows are steady, while 
portfolio equity flows are small in net terms. In 
principle, equity-type liabilities should be helpful 
in a crisis, since foreign investors take an automatic 
hit if the market value of liabilities declines. The 
typical equity investor (corporation, pension fund, 
or mutual fund) is not leveraged, so foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and portfolio equity flows are less 
likely to reverse abruptly. Even when they do, the 
impact may be less damaging than a “sudden stop” 
associated with bank flows. In the case of portfolio 
equity flows, for example, foreign sellers of stocks 
in a crisis face the double penalty of lower local 
currency prices when they sell, as well as a sharp-
ly depreciated exchange rate when they exit. The 
domestic currency-equivalent outflow associated 
with the repatriation of portfolio equity sales pro-
ceeds is small compared to the pre-crisis marked-
to-market value of foreign holdings of equity. 
Instability of Credit Flows
However, debt-type inflows intermediated by 
banks can generate adverse dynamics, especially in 
an environment in which GDP is shrinking, price 
deflation is occurring, and default risk is rising. 
Although bank-related flows are just one compo-
nent of overall capital flows, they are an especially 
FIGURE 2: Components of capital flows (billion dollars)
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procyclical and volatile one that is important for 
transmitting financial conditions. To illustrate 
this, consider Figure 2, which is from the IMF’s 
Global Financial Stability Report of April 2010. It 
shows the capital inflows into forty-one countries, 
including many emerging economies. The nega-
tive green bars starting in 2008Q4 are particularly 
striking, indicating the sharp withdrawal of bank 
flows.8
 
Also apparent in the figure is how the volatility of 
banking-sector credit flows is quite different from 
the volatility of other types of capital flows. 
Procyclical Behavior of Banks and Asset 
Price Amplification
The outsized impact of bank-related capital flows 
derives in part from how banks manage their bal-
ance sheets. Bank lending is highly procyclical, ris-
ing significantly in good times and falling in bad 
times, perhaps even more than the availability of 
projects deserving of funding would imply. Bank 
lending appears to respond not just to the cred-
itworthiness of projects, but also to slack in the 
balance-sheet capacity of banks—in other words, 
their ability to take on additional risk.9 
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FIGURE 3: Scatter chart of two-year change in assets of Barclays against change in equity, debt, 
and risk-weighted assets
Source: Bruno and Shin (2012), data from Bankscope
8  This pattern is confirmed in the econometric results reported by Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011), who find that the sudden stop in capital flows 
during the crisis was primarily concentrated in bank-related flows. Cowan et al. (2008) show that sudden stops are as frequent in emerging 
markets as in developed countries. The difference traditionally has been that in developed countries these sudden stops of inflows are offset by 
a reversal of outflows. During the European crisis, however, there have not been offsetting stoppages of outflows to the sudden stop of inflows. 
Indeed, crisis-hit countries have experienced a “sudden start” of outflows.
9  Procyclicality of banking is a familiar theme in financial economics and has generated an extensive recent literature. See Brunnermeier and 
Sannikov (2011) for a recent formal exposition. 
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This slack is tied to various measures of the market 
price of risk. Figure 3 shows the relevant scatter 
plot for Barclays, a typical global bank. It plots how 
much a change in the balance sheet size of the bank 
is financed through equity and how much through 
debt. (The chart looks similar for other banks.)
Figure 3 shows a virtually one-for-one relation be-
tween the change in assets and the change in debt. 
In effect, assets expand or contract dollar for dollar 
(or pound for pound) through a change in debt. 
What is especially notable is how the risk-weight-
ed assets of the bank (its assets weighted by Basel 
capital risk weights, which in turn determines cap-
ital requirements) barely change, even as the raw 
assets change by hundreds of billions of pounds. 
This phenomenon has a number of explanations. 
First, during the boom banks added assets that 
attracted a low risk weight, such as highly rated 
mortgage-backed securities, while hiding higher 
risk assets off their balance sheet. Second, mea-
sured risks tend to fall during upswings. The fall 
in perceived and actual volatility during the boom 
also leads lenders to sacrifice various margins of 
safety, making them willing to operate at much 
higher leverage ratios.10 
Bank lending thus expands to fill spare balance 
sheet capacity so long as measured risks are low. 
Causation in the reverse direction may also be at 
work—that is, the rapid increase in credit supply 
chasing available borrowers reduces risk spreads, 
as well as the likelihood of distress, so long as the 
credit boom lasts. In the presence of this two-way 
causality, there is the potential for a feedback loop 
in which greater credit supply and the compression 
of risk spreads interact to amplify the credit boom.
This procyclical lending behavior in turns has 
consequences for capital flows. When credit is ex-
panding rapidly, outstripping the pool of available 
retail deposits, the bank will turn to other sourc-
es of funding to support credit growth, typically 
other banks operating as wholesale lenders in the 
capital market. BIS data confirm that the vast bulk 
10 See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
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of cross-border debt is intermediated through the 
domestic banking system.11 
The ability of banks to raise cross-border funding 
then fluctuates over time in line with prevailing “risk 
on/risk off” conditions in global credit markets. To 
illustrate this point, Figure 4 plots banking sector 
capital flows as revealed in external claims (loans 
and deposits) of BIS reporting-country banks vis-à-
vis several emerging and advanced economies. 
The synchronization of banking sector flows across 
disparate recipient regions is striking, notably in 
the period ending in 2008. This synchronization 
suggests the presence of global factors driving 
cross-border bank-related capital flows in a num-
ber of otherwise very different countries.12
Funding Models and Wholesale Funding 
Markets
The connections between the external liabilities 
of the banking sector and financial vulnerability 
can also be viewed from the perspective of balance 
sheet management. As intermediaries that borrow 
in order to lend, banks must raise funding to extend 
credit to borrowers. In an economy with domestic 
savers, the retail deposits of the household sector 
are the main source of funding available to banks—
the “core liabilities” of banks. However, retail de-
posits typically grow in line with the size of the 
economy and the wealth of the household sector, 
not any faster. When credit is growing faster than 
the pool of available retail deposits, banks will turn 
to wholesale funding (their “non-core liabilities”) 
to support credit growth.13 Short-term wholesale 
funding from foreign creditor banks is less stable 
than retail funding, as it is associated with the lend-
ing decisions of global banks in international capi-
tal markets—the banks whose procyclical behavior 
we have already commented upon.14 
FIGURE 5: Non-Core banking funding and 
external liabilities
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Source: Hahm, Shin and Shin (2011)
The schematic in Figure 5 depicts the role of ex-
ternal liabilities in financing credit growth in the 
upswing of the credit cycle. The lower diagram 
in Figure 5 depicts lending during normal times 
when domestic deposits finance lending. In con-
trast, the upper diagram in Figure 5 indicates lend-
ing during booms, when domestic deposits are in-
sufficient to finance the growth in lending so that 
banks draw on external funding. Figure 5 suggests 
that non-core liabilities of banks may convey use-
ful information on the stage of the financial cycle, 
possibly serving as an early warning signal of bur-
geoning risks to financial stability.15
11  Domestic non-banks can obtain debt financing from outside the local banking system by issuing international bonds and other types 
of portfolio debt or by cross-border borrowing from foreign banks. However, direct cross-border debt flows are small relative to bank-
intermediated cross-border flows.
12 See Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Bruno and Shin (2011) for the role of global factors in driving capital flows. 
13  A key question, of course, is why banks do not issue equity to help support the expansion in borrowing. A large literature (see Calomiris 
and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001)) is devoted to explaining why banks may prefer demandable or short-term debt to 
longer term debt or equity. Moreover, during the boom when lending margins are shrinking, banks may be intent on using their capital more 
intensively than on raising more capital. 
14  In this and the subsequent discussion, our major concern is about short-term sources that tend to dominate banks’ wholesale funding. In Chile, 
banks have been issuing long-term bonds as substitutes for their shrinking deposit funding base (as pension funds switch out of bank deposits 
to other investments).
15  Hahm, Shin and Shin (2011) conduct a panel probit study of the susceptibility to financial crises using the non-core liabilities of the banking 
sector as the conditioning variable. They find that non-core bank liabilities, especially the liabilities to the foreign sector, emerge as consistently 
the most robust indicator of the vulnerability to a crisis, both of a collapse in the value of the currency as well as a credit crisis in which lending 
rates rise sharply. 
 BANKS AND CAPITAL FLOWS: POLICY CHALLENGES AND REGULATORY RESPONSES
12
The role of non-core bank liabilities in signaling 
vulnerability may hold more generally, as its pre-
dictive power rests on the cyclical nature of the 
risk-taking by the bank itself. Figure 6 shows the 
liabilities of Northern Rock, the now notorious 
U.K. bank whose failure in 2007 heralded the glob-
al financial crisis. In the nine years from 1998 to 
2007, Northern Rock’s lending increased 6.5 times. 
This increase in lending far outstripped the funds 
raised through retail deposits (in light green), with 
the funding gap filled by wholesale funding (in 
dark green and light blue). 
Although Northern Rock was an outlier in terms of 
its aggressive use of wholesale funding, its case il-
lustrates the general point that the increase in bank 
lending outstrips the increase in core deposit fund-
ing available to a bank during a credit boom. As 
the boom progresses, the bank resorts to non-core 
liabilities to finance its lending. As a rule of thumb, 
the higher the proportion of non-core liabilities, 
the greater the boom, and the greater the vulner-
ability to a setback.
Significantly, the composition of liabilities pro-
vides a better early warning of potential vulnera-
bility than conventional asset-side indicators such 
as non-performing loans or Basel-style capital ra-
tios. It is useful to recall that, in the case of North-
ern Rock, such ratios were perfectly healthy even 
on the eve of the crisis. 
Cross-Border Banking Groups: 
Organizational Structure
 
The organizational structure of international 
banking also matters for the relationship between 
international capital flows and financial stability.16 
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Source: Shin (2009)
16  There are several types of claims in the BIS banking statistics. Cross-border claims are those extended to non-residents. International claims are 
cross-border claims plus local claims on affiliates of foreign banks in foreign currency. Finally, foreign claims are international claims plus local 
claims on affiliates of foreign banks in local currency. This last definition allows us to distinguish local versus foreign funding. 
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Multinational vs International Banks
Here it is important to distinguish between the 
cross-border transactions among non-associated 
banks and cross-border transactions that are inter-
nal to global banking groups.17 Within the general 
category of global banking groups, McCauley et al 
(2010) further distinguish between “multination-
al” banks (collection of affiliates, each mostly re-
lying on local funding) and “international” banks 
(institutions in which decisions are centrally taken 
by HQ, with funding pooled from each source and 
then redistributed from the center). Each type 
raises a distinct set of policy issues. 
The polar case of a “multinational” bank is when 
an institution operates as a collection of country 
affiliates, each with purely local funding and purely 
local assets. While there are no cross-border credit 
flows, the fortunes of the country affiliates are still 
tied together by the global profitability and capital 
of the parent, since this will influence its strategic 
decisions about country-by-country capital lev-
els and lending policies. The value of the global 
banking group depends on the profits/losses of 
each affiliate. Thus even a multi-national bank can 
transmit shocks between countries. Arguably, such 
shocks could be smoothed out by the center, and 
any consequences will be felt only with a lag in-
sofar as they are transmitted through changes in 
affiliate capital. 
In contrast, the international bank could transmit 
shocks more directly and quickly through changes 
in its affiliates’ funding.
Subsidiarization and Funding
In both cases but especially the “international” 
bank model, an important organizational choice is 
whether to structure country affiliates as branches 
or subsidiaries. Subsidiaries are fully incorporated 
entities in the host country and must meet the host 
country standards for capital adequacy and other 
regulations. They have their own capital require-
ments and limits on the relationships with the par-
ent bank, including assets and liability transfers, 
local boards of directors, and so on. Such “ring-
fencing” should make it easier for the host coun-
try to implement an effective macro-prudential 
framework while also making cross-border reso-
lution easier in case of a crisis.18
A related but distinct dimension is the funding 
model. The local operations of the foreign bank can 
be funded mainly from local deposits, or they may 
rely substantially on wholesale funding from the 
parent bank or wholesale market. When lending 
expands faster than core deposits, those deposits 
tend to migrate to non-core-funding reliant banks, 
as we have seen. If foreign-owned banks rely on 
short-term wholesale funding for a substantial 
share of their lending, procyclicality will be built 
into their balance sheet management regardless of 
whether they are branches or subsidiaries.
Foreign-owned banks in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope had the legal form of subsidiaries, to take a 
prominent case in point. While these banks raised 
considerable local funding, a further source of 
cross-border credit was inter-office funding chan-
neled by Western European parents through their 
subsidiaries. In this way, the operations of foreign-
owned banks permitted a faster rate of credit 
growth than would have been possible otherwise. 
In turn, this also set the stage for a potentially cost-
lier contraction. The decision by a major foreign 
bank to contract lending in the host country (for 
instance, in response to regulatory pressures in 
17 See Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010, 2011) and Claessens and van Horen (2012). 
18  That said, host-country regulation of subsidiaries might not be sufficient. Ranciere et al. (2010) show that foreign-owned banks evaded host-
country controls on lending volumes by switching some lending from the local affiliate to direct lending by the parent bank, where these direct 
loans were brokered by the local affiliate.
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the headquarters’ country to conserve capital or 
liquidity) could lead to a slowdown in growth in 
the host country, which in turn could affect the 
decisions of others foreign lenders. The host econ-
omy might find funding abruptly curtailed. Agree-
ments among banks, such as the Vienna Initiative 
brokered by the EBRD, sought to slow the pace of 
credit contraction, but the vulnerability of Central 
and Eastern European economies in the absence of 
such coordination was clear. 
 
By contrast, Latin America, a region that has tra-
ditionally been severely affected by international 
financial turbulence, was relatively resilient during 
the global financial crisis. High levels of indebted-
ness, weak banks and currency mismatches had 
been amplifying factors in previous episodes of 
global financial turbulence, but this time was dif-
ferent. 
Macroeconomic policies—in particular fiscal 
conservatism, monetary policy geared to a price 
stability objective, high degrees of exchange rate 
flexibility, and sound prudential regulation of the 
banking system—all help to explain Latin Ameri-
ca’s resilience. However, the model of integration 
with foreign banks certainly played a role, espe-
cially when compared to emerging Europe. For-
eign banks that want to do retail business and take 
deposits in the great majority of cases incorporate 
in the host country as a subsidiary, that is, a stand-
alone bank rather than as an office. This creates 
a structure of corporate governance that is more 
consistent with local financial stability than one in 
which the affiliate is a branch that follows instruc-
tions and policies dictated by the parent bank.19
An important component of the regulation of for-
eign affiliates is a strict limit on deposits that the 
affiliate can make in the parent bank, so the risk 
of using the local bank to fund the parent bank is 
limited. There may be some ways to circumvent 
the regulation, but when the bank is a subsidiary 
the responsibility is on the local management and 
the local board. In this organizational structure, 
the host country imports the foreign bank’s man-
agement expertise, brand, and technology without 
necessarily suffering from financial contagion in 
the case of a crisis in the parent bank’s economy.
To be sure, requiring subsidiaries to rely on local 
funding and to ring fence their capital has some 
costs—it segments financial markets and hampers 
international movements of capital at times when 
they might be beneficial. To the extent that cross-
border capital flows are not impeded but instead 
are pushed into safer channels, however, the stabil-
ity-enhancing benefits of requiring locally funded 
subsidiaries may dominate. 
Local funding did not prevent a reduction in do-
mestic credit in Latin America after the Lehman 
collapse, but that reduction was not necessar-
ily triggered by procyclical behavior of foreign 
banks. Indeed, the 2009 recession was accompa-
nied by a sharp reduction in domestic credit. This 
was due, however, not just to tighter financial 
conditions on the side of lenders but also to the 
decline in demand for credit. In any case, credit 
recovered once economic conditions improved. 
See Appendix A for a detailed examination of the 
Latin American case.
Valuation Effects, Dollar Funding, and 
Flight to Safety
We have seen the importance of not just net capi-
tal inflows and the current account but also gross 
inflows and outflows and their composition. The 
stock counterparts of gross outflows and inflows 
are foreign assets and liabilities, respectively. 
The values of these stock positions and, hence, a 
19  Many countries adopt the same regulation for branches and subsidiaries. The most relevant difference is that branches do not have a local 
board, while subsidiaries do. With branches, the foreign bank is responsible for any problem in its foreign office. Subsidiaries limit contagion 
across affiliates. In addition, subsidiaries can have local or other partners. These are strong incentives for banks to use the subsidiary model to 
expand across regions, when regulation is mostly the same for all foreign affiliates.
 BANKS AND CAPITAL FLOWS: POLICY CHALLENGES AND REGULATORY RESPONSES
15
country’s net foreign asset position can vary sub-
stantially. With the spectacular increase in the 
holdings of foreign assets and foreign liabilities, 
these valuation effects can swamp current account 
imbalances.20 It is possible that the valuation chan-
nel is systemically stabilizing for some countries 
and shocks but destabilizing for others. This mat-
ters at the macroeconomic level; it is also impor-
tant for financial stability, due to valuation effects 
on bank balance sheets, but also in relation to the 
balance sheets of the banks’ stakeholders (house-
holds, firms, and the government). 
Differences in Foreign Currency Exposures
For example, differences in foreign-currency expo-
sures between emerging Asia and Latin America 
(on the one side) and emerging Europe (on the oth-
er) have had important implications for the stability 
of their financial sectors. Since the first group is long 
in foreign-currency assets in net terms, currency 
depreciation generates a valuation gain. Financial 
and macroeconomic stability is thus enhanced 
if currency depreciation typically occurs during 
downturns. In contrast, emerging Europe has net 
foreign-currency liabilities, so currency deprecia-
tion has an adverse impact on balance sheets.21 
Risk-Sharing Channel 
A second dimension relates to the risk sharing 
properties of net international equity positions and 
net FDI positions transmitted through valuation 
effects. When the world is hit by global shocks, 
countries with net equity and FDI assets absorb 
losses from countries with net equity and FDI li-
abilities.
Large foreign equity liabilities can insulate a coun-
try from domestic shocks, since domestic losses 
are shared with foreign investors. For example, 
the losses from domestic banking crises have been 
partially absorbed by foreign equity investors, 
both through portfolio equity stakes and the value 
of FDI equity positions in foreign-owned banks.
This risk-sharing channel is heavily shaped by 
the different external balance sheet structures of 
countries and their heterogeneous weighting of 
risky versus safe assets on both sides of the balance 
sheet. It is particularly important in times of high 
global volatility. In such an environment, valuation 
effects are particularly large and may lead to sub-
stantial wealth transfers across countries. 
The United States, as the country at the center of the 
international monetary and financial system and 
the issuer of the reserve currency, can be seen as an 
insurance provider in crisis periods.22 Unlike that of 
other countries, its external balance sheet is short 
on “safe” or liquid securities and long on “risky” or 
illiquid ones. For instance, the share of bank loans 
and debt instruments in U.S. external liabilities was 
sixty-three percent on the eve of the crisis in 2007, 
while the share of direct investment and equity 
claims in gross external claims was sixty percent. 
The value of U.S. government bonds, which con-
stitute a large part of the country’s external debt 
liabilities, remained stable or actually increased 
at the height of the crisis. Meanwhile the value 
of its external assets (dominated by riskier equity 
and FDI) plummeted. Thus the net foreign asset 
position of the U.S. declined dramatically. Between 
2007Q4 and 2009Q1, the U.S. net foreign asset 
position deteriorated by twenty-one percent of 
GDP.23 In this way, the United States provided in-
surance to the countries holding U.S. government 
bonds and shared in the losses of collapsing equity 
prices around the world. 
20 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Gourinchas and Rey (2007).
21 Interestingly, Asian economies had net dollar liabilities during the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, and that exposure proved especially destructive.
22 See Gourinchas et al. (2012) for elaboration of this argument.
23 For further details, see Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler (2012) and Milesi-Ferretti (2009).
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Other Safe Havens
Other countries like Germany and Switzerland 
also served as safe havens, albeit on a smaller scale 
and only regionally. For example, Switzerland’s 
debt liabilities fell very little ($6 billion in dollar 
terms) between 2007Q4 and 2009Q1, while the 
value of Swiss external claims collapsed, partly due 
to a decline in the value of Swiss external bond 
holdings. On net, Switzerland made a net trans-
fer of approximately $53 billion (4 percent of Swiss 
GDP) to the rest of the world. 
The ability of countries to benefit from such insur-
ance depends on the characteristics of their ex-
ternal portfolios and not simply on whether they 
invest in safe-haven countries. While the extensive 
U.S. government bond holdings of the People’s 
Bank of China insured China against valuation 
losses during the financial crisis, the large U.S. 
corporate ABS holdings of European banks had 
the opposite effect. This underscores one of the 
main points of this report: large cross-border in-
vestment positions can facilitate risk sharing but 
can also transmit financial contagion. The spe-
cific structure of the external portfolio is critical 
for determining the balance of the two effects. 
 
Capital Flows and the Exchange Rate
Economists have traditionally seen exchange rate 
appreciation driven by capital inflows as self-cor-
recting. Once the currency has appreciated suffi-
ciently, the investors responsible for the capital in-
flows will recognize the change in the risk-return 
configuration and will therefore slow their invest-
ment. Indeed, the standard prescription of the 
official sector continues to follow a lexicographic 
ordering in which the real exchange rate should be 
allowed to appreciate sufficiently, and all the do-
mestic macroeconomic policy responses should be 
exhausted before (and as a last resort) deploying 
measures to stem the capital inflows directly.24
Standard caveats, of course, accompany the stan-
dard prescription. Domestic distortions could be 
responsible for both the capital inflows and the 
exchange rate appreciation. For example, very high 
domestic interest rates may explain why foreign 
investors are willing to take long positions in the 
domestic economy, in particular in the short run. 
In this case there may be a positive correlation be-
tween short-term inflows and exchange rate ap-
preciation, but the ultimate cause will be a third 
factor: the distortion in domestic yields. Problems 
will then be exacerbated if the country authorities 
then attempt to limit appreciation. Anticipated ap-
preciation plus the high domestic interest rate will 
attract additional inflows, dooming the attempt to 
limit appreciation. The implication is that policy-
makers should not attempt to use capital controls 
to defend policy inconsistencies, which often are 
not possible to resolve in the short-run. (Chile’s 
experience in the 1990s, and Brazil’s more recently, 
are especially informative in this context.)
When bank credit constitutes the bulk of inflows, 
there is an additional caveat to the standard pre-
scription of letting the currency appreciate. As 
noted earlier, the behavior of banks and other lev-
eraged institutions is influenced by their capital 
positions and the perceived risks. Currency appre-
ciation and strong profitability coupled with tran-
quil economic conditions can be seen by banks as 
a cue to further expand lending, leading to further 
capital inflows. This is in contrast to the behavior 
of textbook investors, who see an appreciation as a 
cue to start selling the domestic currency. 
Consider the example of a foreign bank branch 
that lends in dollars to local borrowers, who then 
convert the proceeds of the dollar loan into local 
currency, possibly to hedge the currency risk from 
long-term export receivables, or to engage in out-
right speculation that the local currency will ap-
preciate further against the dollar. In such a situa-
tion, an initial appreciation of the recipient coun-
24 Ostry et al. (IMF 2010, 2011)
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try’s currency will strengthen the balance sheets of 
domestic borrowers who have borrowed in dol-
lars. Since borrowers become more creditworthy, 
bank loan books will become less risky, creating 
additional capacity to lend. In this way the initial 
impulse from the appreciation of the domestic 
currency can be amplified through a reinforcing 
mechanism in which greater risk-taking by banks 
reduces credit risk, which elicits even greater risk-
taking by the banks and further appreciation of the 
domestic currency, thereby completing the circle.25 
In such a setting, an appreciation of the domes-
tic currency may not have the presumed effect of 
curtailing capital inflows. The upward phase of the 
cycle will give the appearance of a virtuous circle, 
in which the mutually reinforcing effect of real 
appreciation and improved balance sheets oper-
ate in tandem. Once the cycle turns, however, the 
amplification mechanism operates in reverse, rein-
forcing the financial distress of borrowers and the 
banking sector. 
The basic philosophical divide is therefore between 
those who do and do not believe that real apprecia-
tion eventually chokes off capital inflows due to a 
reassessment of the attractiveness of the destina-
tion currency. Members of the first camp (the tra-
ditional view) believe that capital flows are driven 
by textbook portfolio investors who are motivated 
by fundamental assessments of currency values, 
25  The potential for feedback between capital inflows and compressed credit risk in the recipient economy generates a potential channel for cross-
border monetary policy spillovers. See Bruno and Shin (2012).
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while members of the second camp believe that 
capital flows are driven not only by assessments of 
fundamental value but also by the short-term im-
peratives of bank balance sheet capacity and what 
Borio and Disyatat (2011) refer to as the “excess 
elasticity” of credit.
 
During the last few years, the tension between 
these two views has become apparent in policy 
circles and multilateral organizations such as the 
IMF and BIS, who have begun to reassess the 
traditional lexicographic ordering of policy op-
tions. Domestic distortions in the capital receiving 
countries may not be the only important distor-
tions, in other words. To the extent that “excess 
elasticity” in sending country institutions is also 
a problem, an adequate policy response can take 
place only at the global level. 
Second Best Again
There is, of course, another way. Given the bad 
experience during previous crises, financial sys-
tems in emerging markets, in particular in Latin 
America and Asia, have become much more resil-
ient to exchange rate fluctuations. Figure 7 shows 
exchange rate fluctuations during the recent crisis. 
The figure shows the large fluctuations in emerg-
ing market currencies. The number in brackets is 
the percentage depreciation, from minimum to 
maximum, over that period. All Latin American 
currencies in the figure depreciated roughly sixty 
percent, while the Korean won depreciated almost 
seventy percent, and the Indonesian rupiah depre-
ciated by forty percent. Other emerging markets 
not shown in the figure experienced more moder-
ate depreciations on the order of twenty percent. 
In earlier periods, these exchange rate fluctuations 
would have threatened financial stability. This time, 
however, banking systems were more robust. Part 
of the explanation is the more robust health of sov-
ereigns, which could support their banks as need-
ed. In addition, the foreign-currency exposures of 
emerging Asia and Latin America shifted radically 
over the last decade.26 Many of these countries are 
now “long” foreign currencies, with foreign-cur-
rency assets (mostly reserves) exceeding foreign-
currency liabilities. This allows them to undertake 
currency depreciations without damaging the ag-
gregate balance sheet. For their part, regulators and 
bank management are also more wary about allow-
ing asset liability mismatches to build up.
This is not to say that foreign-currency risks have 
been eliminated. In Brazil, Korea, and Mexico, 
some non-financial corporations engaged in cur-
rency speculation, resulting in losses to the finan-
cial system, and in some cases prompting some 
central banks to intervene in order to limit cur-
rency depreciation. However, the problems never 
rose to the point of threatening financial stability. 
All this suggests that in the absence of global rules 
and regulations, domestic regulations that ensure 
banks are cautious about asset liability mismatch-
es, and that ensure the financial system is resilient 
to large changes in asset prices, can make an im-
portant difference. 
Contrast the more cautious approach followed by 
the authorities in Asia and Latin America with 
that in Central and Eastern Europe.27 For peg-
gers such as Latvia, the foreign-currency debt was 
a major constraint on adjustment to the crisis. In 
Latvia, with its debt denominated in euros, de-
valuation would have had a devastating impact on 
the balance sheets of banks and other borrowers 
with foreign-currency liabilities. Lack of access to 
foreign-currency liquidity meant that adjustment 
pressures were greater for these countries than for 
otherwise similar economies, a problem that was 
26 See Lane and Shambaugh (2010) for the changes over this time. 
27  Descriptively, much of the foreign-currency debt was intermediated through foreign-owned banks in these countries. However, for a sample of 
emerging European banks, Brown and De Haas (2012) estimate that there is no difference between foreign-owned and locally-owned banks in 
their propensity to make foreign-currency loans.
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ameliorated if not solved through official funding 
by the IMF and the European Commission. 
In contrast, for countries with flexible exchange 
rates, such as Hungary, currency depreciation had 
cross-cutting effects. A weaker currency was good 
for the trade balance, but it created balance sheet 
problems by increasing the local-currency value of 
euro and Swiss franc liabilities.
Capital flows within the euro area are a useful test-
ing ground of the relationship between a common 
currency and credit flows. The empirical evidence 
is that the elimination of currency risk among the 
member states strongly promoted cross-border 
credit flows, as was evident in rapid growth in the 
inter-bank market, money markets, and bond mar-
kets after the creation of the euro.28 This increased 
the dispersion of credit growth rates across euro 
area member-states by encouraging wholesale 
funding flows to banks in faster-growing countries 
from banks in slower-growing countries.29 
Faster-growing countries also typically experi-
enced higher inflation rates. With a common 
nominal interest rate, real interest rates were lower 
in the faster-growing countries, exacerbating dif-
ferences in spending levels and borrowing pat-
terns. In principle, countervailing measures could 
have been taken. However, fiscal policies were not 
strongly counter-cyclical during this period, to put 
an understated gloss on the point.30 National bank 
regulators did not use macro-prudential policies 
to rigorously control credit growth.
Finally, the European Central Bank has been an im-
portant buffer mechanism for the euro area during 
the crisis. The large-scale exit of private credit flows 
from the deficit countries has been replaced by ECB 
lending through its liquidity operations. This has 
moderated the impact of the sudden stop, although 
the exposure of the ECB to deficit countries poses 
tail risk to the general membership if banks in defi-
cit countries default on their official obligations.
28 See Lane (2006, 2010) for details. 
29 See Lane and McQuade (2012).
30 See Benetrix and Lane (2012). 
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CHAPTER 3
Policy Implications
T
he previous sections have shown that the in-
creasing complexity of financial markets and 
high level of international financial integra-
tion generate significant risks both within and 
across national borders. Capital flows can act as 
a channel for the build-up of financial sector im-
balances as well as the transmission of risks across 
national borders. For these reasons, our Com-
mittee has placed better regulatory policies at the 
national level and coordination of regulatory and 
macroeconomic policies across countries as being 
critical ingredients for the maintenance of global 
financial stability. 
The coordination of monetary and macroeconom-
ic policies was the focus of our previous report, 
Rethinking Central Banking. In this report, which 
can be thought of as a complement to its predeces-
sor, we focus instead on capital flows and finan-
cial regulation, especially of the macro-prudential 
type. International coordination is every bit as 
important in this context. The problem is that it 
is all too rare. What makes international capital 
flows special—and, sometimes, especially danger-
ous—is that policy makers do not always internal-
ize the externalities that their policies impose on 
other countries. This failure to coordinate regula-
tory policies provides a rationale for paying special 
attention to capital flows. 
Furthermore, our analysis has highlighted the spe-
cial risks posed by cross-border banking flows. It is 
in this area that appropriate regulatory and macro-
economic policies can have the greatest impact in 
terms of improving the benefit-risk tradeoff from 
financial integration. Hence, we focus on bank 
regulation in discussing the policy implications of 
our analysis. 
The spillover effects of individual country policies 
transmitted through financial channels suggest 
that coordination of policies, especially in terms 
of banking regulation, would be broadly benefi-
cial. We therefore turn now to some specific areas 
where such coordination can be helpful and sug-
gest how they should be implemented, ideally at 
the global level. 
Of course, international policy coordination is not a 
panacea, and it may not always be feasible, given po-
litical constraints. In the absence of adequate inter-
national coordination, it may be necessary to depart 
from the First Best approach that takes as its ideal 
the frictionless model of the economy and regards 
any policy that introduces further deviations from 
the model as being unlikely to improve outcomes. 
In this case, policy makers should instead adopt a 
Second Best approach with which they might inter-
vene to introduce a new friction to offset an existing 
one. The combination could improve efficiency. 
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This Second Best approach requires a more com-
prehensive evaluation of the entire system to see 
what interventions might help. It is therefore more 
demanding of policy makers and is potentially 
more prone to policy errors. 
A particular danger with this approach is that it 
can provide license for all manner of interven-
tions, including some with the potential to worsen 
outcomes. Each and every anti-market campaign-
er could appeal to a hypothetical distortion to jus-
tify his or her favorite intervention. The antidote 
to such policy adventurism is evidence, both in the 
analysis leading up to policy formulation and in 
decisions of whether to implement and maintain 
a policy. 
Coordination of Regulatory Policies
The coordination of financial regulation can occur 
on four levels. The weakest form of coordination is 
information sharing about systemically important 
institutions. Applying common rules across juris-
dictions and creating a common level field is more 
ambitious. Common enforcement through shared 
cross-border regulatory and supervisory agencies, 
as is currently under discussion in the European 
Union, is stronger still. The strongest form of coor-
dination entails a willingness to share losses from 
supervisory failures among countries, leading ul-
timately to an arrangement that is similar to what 
we observe within unitary and federal states. 
Data Sharing
Data sharing is a first step toward a better-coordi-
nated outcome. In the context of bank-intermedi-
ated flows, for example, it is difficult to evaluate po-
tential spillover effects that foreign fund providers 
can have on the domestic market if the domestic 
regulator has only an incomplete picture of the fi-
nancial soundness of the fund providers. This in-
formation is obviously critical for systemically im-
portant financial institutions (SIFIs), but it is also 
important for smaller institutions. For non-SIFIs, it 
is important to share information about the extent 
to which their holdings are correlated. Many small 
foreign fund providers can become systemic if they 
behave as a herd, thus triggering contagion. Finally, 
regulators should also share their action plan in 
case of a crisis to minimize externalities. Overall, 
mutual data sharing arrangements help build trust 
in an international regulatory community. 
Common Enforcement – Banking Union
Data sharing and common rules are important 
building blocks for internalizing the cross-border 
externalities that can flow from supervision and 
regulation at the national level. Rules, however, are 
no better than their enforcement. At a minimum 
there should be a court of arbitration to over-
come disputes about enforcement of various rules 
similar to the one that allows countries to resolve 
WTO trade conflicts. A stronger version would 
be a “banking union”, which is currently under 
discussion in Europe. In its strongest form, this 
would entail a single central regulator with powers 
of regulation and resolution backed up by national 
regulators who complement the work of the cross-
border regulator, especially in overseeing smaller 
financial institutions.
Loss Sharing – Mutual Insurance
Closer coordination involves some form of loss 
sharing in the absence of a full banking union and 
a single resolution authority but rather common 
enforcement of national rules. To avoid moral haz-
ard, national governments should control the de-
sign and enforcement of financial regulation and 
bear the losses. When responsibility is shared, it is 
important to have in place loss-sharing arrange-
ments ex ante, since these are notoriously difficult 
to introduce after the losses have materialized. 
They should be organized before a crisis (“under 
the veil of ignorance”) in the form of a mutual in-
surance scheme. One specific organizational form 
in this context is a common deposit insurance 
scheme of the sort that is currently under discus-
sion in Europe.
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Policy Implications for Europe
Even if one agrees that strict regulation of capital 
flows and renationalization of financial systems 
is appropriate in some instances, there is no pre-
sumption that renationalization is the universal 
answer in all cases. The euro area is a case in point, 
given the very severe disruptions that would be 
caused by any attempt to return to separate nation-
al currencies and segmented financial systems. The 
euro area is therefore a case where prescriptions 
may differ substantially from those appropriate 
for an emerging economy. Rather than requiring 
renationalization of the financial system, a more 
thoroughgoing integration at the level of the mon-
etary union should be the objective of policy. 
The euro area already has the institutions for con-
ducting a common monetary policy. In this re-
spect, it comes closer than any other collection of 
countries to replicating features generally charac-
teristic of a single sovereign jurisdiction. However, 
the euro area still lacks a banking and financial 
union. This gives rise to a number of problems: 
•	 Since investors face no exchange rate risk, 
the build-up of imbalances can be even 
higher than in an environment with sepa-
rate national currencies. 
•	 The existence of a single currency makes 
it more difficult to use monetary policy 
to lean against credit booms in individual 
countries. This heightens the importance 
of putting in place appropriately designed 
national and regional macro-prudential 
institutions and tools.31
•	 While the euro area has a common mon-
etary policy, bank regulation remains frag-
mented. Europe has relied on a division 
of labor between home and host authori-
ties that assigns responsibility for finan-
cial institutions to the first (in the case 
of branches) and responsibility for coun-
try-wide financial stability to the second. 
While the EU has created a pair of trans-
national regulatory bodies, the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the Eu-
ropean Banking Authority (EBA), neither 
of these has direct powers. They can issue 
warnings, but they can only request action 
from national authorities.
•	 Differences in the fiscal condition and 
macroeconomic policies of different gov-
ernments, actual and perceived, have led 
to differences in the financing costs faced 
by similar firms in different countries. 
•	 Banks in the euro area still exhibit a strong 
home bias in their credit and bond port-
folios, which makes them sensitive to 
domestic macroeconomic and financial 
events.32 A collapse in real estate prices, 
doubts about the solvency of the sover-
eign, or problems in the corporate sector 
can give rise to doubts about the solvency 
of the banking system, given the concen-
trated domestic exposures. 
•	 With seventeen independent national fis-
cal authorities, the euro area is at risk of 
drifting into a “fiscal dominance regime” 
in which the central bank loses power 
over monetary policy if some fiscal au-
thorities do not follow a responsible debt 
path.33 The central bank will then face two 
unpleasant alternatives: higher inflation 
or sovereign default. A fiscal union or a 
stronger disciplining mechanism is essen-
tial to avoid this problem. 
31 See, for example, Brunnermeier (2010).
32 See Brunnermeier (2010).
33  For the fiscal theory of the price level at which a central bank has to deal with several fiscal authorities see, e.g., Sims (1999) and Canzoneri et 
al. (2010).
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In recognition of the necessity for a banking union, 
the allocation of primary regulatory authority to 
the ECB is currently under negotiation although 
the division of responsibility between the ECB 
and national regulators is not yet settled. However, 
this has to be reinforced by agreement among the 
member countries in relation to the fiscal backstop 
for the banking union, in terms of common de-
posit insurance and a common resolution fund.
In many respects, the capital flow reversal that 
occurred in Europe in 2009-10 was a surprise for 
policy makers. Until the crisis, the conventional 
wisdom held that current account deficits would 
be financed automatically in the monetary union 
in the same way they are financed within a coun-
try. Research seemed to concur, with the notable 
exception of Garber (1998), who foresaw that 
the TARGET system, through which imbalances 
among members of the European System of Cen-
tral Banks are settled, was susceptible to a finan-
cial-account crisis.34 
The logical conclusion is that deeper integration of 
the financial system through a fully-fledged bank-
ing union is the correct prescription for Europe’s 
current problems. The case for a banking union is 
stronger still if one believes that the common mon-
etary policy in place within the euro area achieves 
better implicit coordination than would policies 
chosen by countries based primarily on domestic 
considerations. Since the absence of coordinated 
monetary policy is an important reason for choos-
ing the Second Best approach to capital flows, the 
euro area does not face this particular impediment 
to deeper integration.35
Nevertheless, it is far from guaranteed that the strat-
egy for full financial integration being pursued by 
European policy makers will be met with success, 
given the unfavorable economic backdrop and 
shifting political imperatives in each country. For 
the moment, the euro area is best characterized 
not as a true economic and financial union but as a 
monetary union embedded in a single market for 
financial products. For the arrangement to survive, 
this will have to change.
One thing is certain. The euro crisis and responses 
now being proposed set an important benchmark 
for thinking about the policy toward unfettered 
capital flows. If deeper integration can’t work in 
Europe, then it will be difficult for it to work well 
elsewhere. The experience of the euro area should 
be seen as a litmus test for the First Best approach 
to capital flows. It represents perhaps the most fa-
vorable environment where the vision of the fully 
integrated financial system in the First Best per-
spective may be used as a guide for policy. The 
analogy would be the financial development of 
the United States and how it overcame the borders 
between the individual regions and States. It is for 
this reason that much hangs on the success or fail-
ure of the European policy response. If the First 
Best approach fails in the euro area, then it is prob-
ably inappropriate in other contexts. 
Operationalizing the Second Best 
Approach
While we have made a case for coordination of 
regulatory policies as a necessary component of 
the First Best approach to managing capital flows, 
the ideal of enlightened global financial regulation 
remains elusive, and not just in Europe. This points 
to the need to think systematically about how to 
implement the Second Best approach. 
34  Target, or Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System, is essentially a settlement system for inter-bank 
transactions among banks in the euro zone. More recently, Sinn (2012) has drawn attention to the growing imbalances in the TARGET system.
35  Of course, coordination is best achieved when each country has its own policy but they sit together to discuss spillovers and necessary policy 
adjustments. With a common monetary policy, coordination is implicitly and imperfectly achieved by considering the one-size-fits-all policy 
that works best for the zone as a whole. 
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But even if one accepts the validity of the Second 
Best approach, formulating the policies that flow 
from it remains challenging. The challenge is not 
just to identify the impediments to frictionless 
markets (the task of the First Best approach) but 
also to figure out what combination of interven-
tions and mitigation of impediments will help 
enhance the net benefits of capital flows. Opera-
tionalizing the Second Best approach is thus a for-
midable task. It has great potential for error and is 
susceptible to capture by special interests.
The suitable sequencing and combination of policy 
options, both internal and external, will depend on 
the circumstances faced by the policy maker. It will 
not be easy to create simple “hierarchies” of policy 
options that require the use first of one tool then, 
only when it loses the power to influence, another 
(for instance in the oft-repeated prescription that 
central banks should first exhaust regulatory mea-
sures before they resort to the interest rate tool in 
fighting credit and asset price booms). In practice, 
policy measures have non-trivial trade-offs de-
pending on the severity of the respective distor-
tion. The slope of the trade-off will rarely be zero 
or infinite, as envisaged by the simplistic recom-
mendations of a “policy hierarchy” that puts the 
full burden of adjustment on first one set of poli-
cies, then another. 
Before discussing implementation of the Second 
Best approach, it is instructive to consider why, de-
spite the potential benefits to coordination of regu-
latory policies, progress to date has been so limited. 
The multilateral process governing the reform of 
banking regulation led by the Group of Twenty, the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has shown 
how difficult regulatory reform discussions can be. 
The 2008 crisis created an unusual receptiveness to 
proposals for bold reform of financial regulation, 
reflecting shock that the global economy could be 
thrown into a crisis of such magnitude. The ini-
tial proposals for reform of capital adequacy re-
quirements by the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS (2009)) reflected that sense 
of urgency. The centerpiece of the initial propos-
als for Basel III was a substantially strengthened 
common equity buffer together with newly intro-
duced liquidity requirements and a leverage cap, 
and a countercyclical capital buffer together with 
a capital surcharge for the systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs).
However, momentum dissipated as detailed dis-
cussions moved through the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS). Negotiations came up against 
the familiar tension between the role of banking 
supervisors as guardians of financial stability and 
their role as champions of domestic banking sec-
tor interests. In the latter role, supervisors take on 
the role akin to trade negotiators, their objective to 
secure the “best deal” for domestic interests. 
European global banks that had seen some of the 
fastest lending growith in the years before the 
Lehman crisis in 2008 were among the institutions 
that stood to be adversely affected by the proposed 
strengthening of capital standards. In this context, 
the trade negotiation aspect of the multilateral 
bank regulatory reform process took on increas-
ing importance. The initial proposals of the Basel 
Committee (BCBS (2009)), which reflected the ini-
tial round of negotiations between national regu-
lators, were further watered down along several 
key dimensions, and even the weakened proposals 
were only accepted when the adjustment period for 
their adoption was extended to 2019—a full nine 
years from the date of agreement. The purported 
rationale for this delay was to prevent too massive 
a deleveraging process in the context of a weak 
world economy, but in reality that was only part of 
the story. Overlooked was the fact that forcing the 
banks to issue new equity would have addressed 
the need to hold more capital without aggravating 
deleveraging, and destabilizing the economy. 
The dilution of even the most basic measures to 
strengthen bank regulation in the course of these 
negotiations throws into relief the difficulties of 
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reaching agreement in a multilateral setting when 
advancing domestic interests are an important 
objective of national negotiators.36 Regulating the 
shadow banking systems and OTC markets for de-
rivatives have encountered similar difficulties.
From the Second Best perspective, the inability of 
multilateral bodies to coordinate effectively means 
that individual countries will have to pursue na-
tional solutions. Prudential tools that limit capital 
imports or direct capital controls should be seen as 
examples of this national approach.
The Macro-Prudential Framework
The existing micro-prudential approach to finan-
cial regulation rests on the role of capital as a buf-
fer against loss, with the focus on the “loss absor-
bency” of bank capital. There are two important 
shortcomings of such an approach.
•	 Loss absorbency does not directly address 
excessive asset growth during booms, 
when the vulnerabilities to financial crises 
build up. 
•	 The preoccupation with loss absorbency 
diverts attention from the liability side of 
banks’ balance sheets and vulnerabilities 
from the reliance on unstable short-term 
funding and short-term foreign currency 
funding. 
This points to the importance of supplementing 
traditional micro-prudential tools with macro-
prudential policies. Macro-prudential policies 
are aimed, in the first instance, at dampening the 
pro-cyclicality of the financial system. They act by 
leaning against excessively rapid growth of credit 
in booms, thereby helping achieve more sustain-
able long-term loan growth, while at the same time 
reducing the liability side’s vulnerability to sharp 
reversals in global liquidity conditions. 
A macro-prudential policy framework consists of: 
•	 A set of indicators that shed light on the 
procyclicality of the financial system and 
signal potential vulnerability to financial 
instability; and 
•	 A set of policy tools that can complement 
existing micro-prudential regulatory tools 
in order to mitigate the build-up of risks. 
Asset price booms fueled by short-term credit de-
serve special attention, since the bursting of credit 
bubbles leads to more deleveraging and stronger 
amplification mechanisms.37 In this case, potential 
relevant macro-prudential indicators are the rate 
of growth of private credit relative to GDP and 
the rate of growth of key credit-fueled asset prices 
such as those of housing. In addition, this report 
provides some rationale for taking note of special-
ized monetary aggregates such as the “non-core 
liabilities” of the banking sector as indicators of 
financial vulnerability. 
Monetary policy also has implications for capital 
flows, non-core liabilities, and the balance sheet 
composition of domestic and global banks [see 
Rethinking Central Banking]. Hence, monetary 
36  Some simple steps could certainly be taken to improve information sharing among supervisors and investors across major financial centers. 
For example, the divergence between accounting standards on both sides of the Atlantic prevents straightforward and accurate comparisons 
of the balance sheets of large banks. The leverage ratios released in the public domain of U.S. Banks and European banks are not comparable, 
creating much confusion among the general public and some analysts. The leverage ratios of U.S. banks appear generally lower, as in the U.S. 
accounting-standards the derivatives exposures with the same counterparty are reported netted, while European banks report gross derivative 
positions, which makes risk exposure more transparent. There are also some differences on the (non) reporting of off-balance sheet items. If an 
agreement cannot be reached by the IASB, the private body in charge of these issues on harmonizing accounting standards, then, at least large 
banks (SIFIs) should be asked to report under both standards. This would enhance transparency and enable supervisors who have to monitor 
risk of subsidiaries of large banks within their jurisdictions to have fully comparable data across entities. 
37  An immediate question is why supposedly rational market participants find it more profitable to ride the trend “as long as the music is playing” 
rather than lean against it. In a setting in which a correction occurs only after a sufficiently large number of market participants change course, 
it is possible that each individual waits for others to move (see, for example, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)). As a consequence, the necessary 
correction often occurs after large imbalances have already developed. 
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policy has important financial stability effects. By 
the same token, macro-prudential policy that cur-
tails loan growth will have an impact on aggregate 
demand and real economic activity, and hence will 
have a direct impact on the stabilization of macro-
economic activity. It is thus worth reemphasizing 
here that a neat division between monetary policy 
and policies aimed at financial stability is unlikely 
to be useful in principle, or viable in practice. 
Turning to specific macro-prudential tools that 
can complement more traditional monetary policy 
tools, capital requirements that lean against overly 
rapid credit expansion can mitigate the lending cy-
cle. The idea that the required capital buffer should 
vary over the financial cycle has been discussed for 
some time.38 The framework for countercyclical 
capital buffers as envisaged in the Basel III frame-
work has focused on the ratio of credit to GDP as 
an appropriate indicator of the stage of the finan-
cial cycle.39 
There are measurement challenges, however, even 
for something as seemingly straightforward as 
credit growth. To serve as a signal of pro-cyclicali-
ty, any measure should mirror risk-taking attitudes 
or market risk premiums. The need for judgment 
is especially important in emerging and develop-
ing economies insofar as rapid financial develop-
ment renders statistics on credit growth less useful 
as a gauge of risk appetite. Further research will be 
necessary to determine to what extent the simple 
credit to GDP ratio can serve as a finely calibrated 
signal that can support the use of automatic tight-
ening of bank capital standards, as envisaged in the 
Basel III framework. 
Caps on bank leverage may be a useful supplemen-
tary way of limiting asset growth by tying total assets 
to bank equity. The rationale for leverage caps rests 
on the role of bank capital as a constraint on new 
lending rather than the Basel approach of bank cap-
ital as a buffer against loss. Leverage constraints are 
de facto capital requirements with no risk weights. 
The main constraint on credit expansion is bank eq-
uity, which may be regarded by the bank as being 
a more expensive funding source than short-term 
debt. By requiring a larger equity base to fund the 
total size of the balance sheet, the regulator can slow 
down asset growth. Of course, without a countercy-
clical link these measures can be counterproductive, 
as they lead to more constraints in the downturn 
and thereby amplify volatility.40 
Removing tax subsidies for debt would eliminate 
an important distortion to bank capital structures. 
However, the key concern for banks is not leverage 
per se but short-term leverage. Removing the tax 
advantage of debt would do little to move banks to 
longer funding maturities. Similarly, forcing banks 
to raise more capital can contribute to stability, but 
it will also dampen intermediation if banks find 
short-term debt to be less expensive. We need new 
ways to raise effective bank capital that also take 
into account the behavior of bank management.41
 
In addition to regulatory tools that influence the 
bank’s balance sheet management, there are ad-
ministrative tools that act as brakes on bank as-
set growth directly, such as caps on loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratios and debt-service-to-income (DTI) 
ratios. LTV regulation restricts the amount of the 
loan so as not to exceed some percentage of the val-
ue of the collateral asset. DTI caps operate by limit-
ing the debt service costs of the borrower so as not 
to exceed some fixed percentage of verified income. 
The macro-prudential rationale for imposing LTV 
and DTI caps is not only to limit bank lending so as 
to prevent both the build-up of non-core liabilities 
to funding such loans but also to lean against the 
decline in lending standards that is associated with 
38 The Geneva Report on bank regulation (Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud and Shin (2009)) develops this theme.
39 The work of BIS economists, especially Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004) has been influential in the shape of the Basel III bank regulation rules. 
40 See e.g. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011).
41 See, for example, Flannery (2005) or Kashyap et al. (2008).
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rapid asset growth. Although LTV ratio caps are 
familiar tools, DTI caps are less widespread. DTI 
rules have the advantage that bank loan growth 
can be tied at least loosely to wage growth. How-
ever, DTI rules require considerable information 
and administrative capacity; they imply the ability 
to monitor total borrowing and the need for a cen-
tralized credit registry. Not all jurisdictions have 
such capacity— for instance, the United States has 
credit registries only at the county level, so it could 
not easily apply DTI rules. Since property market 
booms and busts have been particularly damaging, 
tools targeted at limiting credit growth in these 
markets when they overheat will be particularly 
valuable. Needless to say, a close look at the distor-
tions induced by policies such as mortgage subsi-
dies is also warranted.
 
Macro-prudential tools that act directly on lending 
growth could be dubbed “asset-side tools” as they 
act on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. By 
analogy, liability-side tools operate on the liability 
side of bank balance sheets, thereby addressing the 
build-up of liquidity and currency mismatches and 
the underpricing of risk on global capital markets. 
The Korean levy on non-core liabilities in effect 
since August 2011 is a case in point. Banks pay a 
levy of twenty basis points per year on foreign-cur-
rency-denominated liabilities of less than twelve-
month maturity. The revenues are paid into a spe-
cial foreign exchange reserve account. A similar 
levy introduced by the U.K. in 2010 has the rev-
enue paid into the general governmental fiscal ac-
count and is therefore better thought of as a fiscal 
measure rather than as a countercyclical macro-
prudential measure. 
Quasi-fiscal tools like the bank levy are relative 
newcomers compared to traditional capital con-
trol methods, such as the unremunerated reserve 
requirement (URR) pioneered by Chile during the 
1990s and utilized subsequently by countries like 
Colombia. Colombia put in place a URR in 2007-
08, when the central bank required importers of 
capital to deposit a fraction of their balances at the 
central bank. This is equivalent to a tax on foreign 
inflows, whose rate depends on the opportunity 
cost of funding. The popularity of measures such as 
the URR may be due in part to the fact that central 
banks have been in charge of both prudential pol-
icy and monetary management. The central bank 
normally has had discretion to use URR policies 
without going through the legislative procedures 
associated with other types of capital controls such 
as levies and taxes.
A limitation of the URR is that its effectiveness is 
severely curtailed in an environment with low in-
terest rates. Although the URR is an implicit tax on 
a balance sheet item, the implied tax rate will vary 
with the opportunity cost of funds and hence with 
the interest rate. The variability of the effective tax 
rate thus implies the need for regular adjustment 
of the reserve rate, for example by raising reserve 
requirements when interest rates are low. 
The legislative process required to implement a 
levy can entail considerable delay.42 When the ex-
ternal environment is changing rapidly, long de-
lays make the introduction of a levy impractical. 
Nevertheless, as in Korea’s case, alternative mea-
sures that rely on existing legislation or other tem-
porary measures can be used in the interim until 
the longer-term policy measures come into force. 
Capital Controls
Capital controls are close cousins of liability-side 
macro-prudential policies. The IMF has recently 
suggested the more neutral term, “capital flow 
management” (CFM) policies (IMF 2011).
The distinguishing feature of capital control mea-
sures is that they discriminate on the basis of the 
42  In the case of Korea, discussions on the levy began in February 2010 (Shin (2010)), but the eventual announcement of the implementation 
followed in December 2010. The legislative hurdles were cleared in April 2011, and the levy implemented in August 2011. The whole process 
took 18 months, illustrating the practical challenges in setting up a new system.
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residence of the investor. Examples include inflow 
taxes like Brazil’s IOF as well as administrative 
measures that restrict or prohibit certain activi-
ties or investments by foreign investors. Although 
capital controls have been employed with the goal 
of limiting the rate of exchange-rate appreciation, 
their effectiveness in this context is contested. 
There is better evidence on the financial stability 
consequence of capital controls. Ostry et al. (2011) 
note that there is a strong empirical association 
between capital controls on the one hand and less 
severe forms of credit booms and FX borrowing 
on the other. The authors take the recent financial 
crisis as a natural experiment into the effectiveness 
of capital controls and conclude that the evidence 
is “suggestive of greater growth resilience in coun-
tries that had either capital controls (especially on 
debt liabilities) or prudential measures in place in 
the years prior to the crisis.”43 Of course, the coun-
tries that had controls or prudential measures in 
place are not a randomly selected sample. More 
work will be needed to place these findings on a 
firm footing. 
Magud, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) provide a 
“meta-analysis” of the survey literature on the ef-
fects of capital controls. Based on thirty-seven em-
pirical studies, they find that controls on inflows 
seem to make monetary policy more independent, 
alter the composition of capital flows, and reduce 
real exchange rate pressures (although the evi-
dence there is more controversial). The change in 
the composition of flows is key from a financial 
stability perspective. As argued earlier, long-term 
equity and/or FDI financing is relatively stable and 
hence should be welcomed. Capital controls on in-
flows seem not to reduce the volume of net flows 
or the current account balance. As to controls on 
outflows, the instances of their use are much rarer, 
with the experiment by Malaysia during the 1997 
Asian financial crisis standing as an example high 
on many observers’ lists. In Malaysia, controls 
reduced outflows and may have given room for 
more independent monetary policy (the other 
poster child does not fare as well, in that our results 
are not as conclusive as for the Chilean controls 
on inflows). Apart from the Malaysian experience, 
there is little in the form of systematic evidence of 
“success” in imposing controls, however defined.44 
The Malaysian experience illustrates the stigma as-
sociated with controls on capital outflows, which 
can be seen as violating a basic undertaking by 
the host country to respect the rights of investors. 
However, the stigma does not stop there. There 
can be a similar though less severe form associated 
with controls on inflows. For countries that have 
signed up to legal obligations that prevent them 
from imposing controls, such as members of the 
European Union (and more loosely, members of 
the OECD), capital controls can not only carry 
stigma but also violate treaty obligations. 
In any case, a distinctive feature of the controls on 
outflows imposed by Malaysia as well as Iceland 
and several other countries during crisis periods 
is that they were imposed in the midst of a finan-
cial meltdown and were intended to be temporary. 
The stigma associated with measures applied in 
financial emergencies may be less of a concern, 
especially in the context of those emergency situ-
ations when a country’s broader credibility is al-
ready in question. By contrast, the imposition of 
capital controls on a longer-term basis to try and 
compensate for weak policies is only likely to delay 
painful adjustment. 
43  Ostry, Jonathan D., Atish Ghosh, Karl Habermeier, Marcos Chamon, Mahvash S. Qureshi, and Dennis B.S. Reinhardt. “Capital Inflows: The 
Role of Controls,” IMF Staff Position Note 10/04, 2010: 23.
44  Magud, Nicolas, Carmen M Reinhart, and Kenneth S Rogoff. “Capital Controls: Myth and Reality – A Portfolio Balance Approach,” NBER 
Working Paper 16805, February, 2011: 2.
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CHAPTER 4
Summary and Recommendations
T
his committee has consistently made a case 
for greater coordination across countries in 
both regulatory and macroeconomic policies. 
Our previous report, Rethinking Central Banking, 
laid out the case for monetary policy coordination. 
This one lays out a parallel framework for regula-
tory coordination to be disciplined and fine-tuned 
in light of evidence and experience. 
We also recognize that in practice such coordina-
tion is not straightforward to design or implement, 
even when the interests of the relevant countries 
are congruent. Moreover, even when coordination 
is globally optimal, it still may generate tensions 
with national governance. 
If effective international coordination proves to 
be impossible, then the best approach is for coun-
tries to design frameworks that mitigate the risks 
of cross-border flows at the national level. We also 
provide a number of recommendations from the 
perspective of individual country policy makers 
who may be virtuous themselves but often have to 
cope with the fallout from the weak regulatory and 
macroeconomic policies of other countries. 
Our main conclusions and recommendations are 
as follows:
1. The policy maker’s goal is to reap the benefits 
from cross-border capital flows while guarding 
against potential financial stability costs. 
Reaping the benefits entails resisting vested in-
terests that push for barriers to capital flows as 
a way of resisting necessary structural reforms 
and fiscal adjustments. Good macroeconomic 
and structural policies form the bedrock of fi-
nancial stability. 
2. Persistent current account imbalances pose 
financial stability risks and have implications 
for the sustainability of net external asset po-
sitions. Multilateral discussions rightly place 
global rebalancing high on the global agenda. 
At the same time, such discussions should be 
linked to the broader nature of the debate on 
capital flows, and especially the connections 
between capital flows and financial stability, 
the procyclical nature of such flows, and the 
role of monetary policy spillovers in magnify-
ing that procyclicality.
3. Guarding against financial instability requires 
tracking of the complete matrix of gross cross-
border capital flows rather than focusing exclu-
sively on net flows. The structure of international 
balance sheets is an important determinant of in-
ternational transmission of shocks and needs to 
be monitored perhaps even more carefully than 
net flows or net asset positions. Depending on 
the characteristics of those balance sheets, they 
can either foster risk sharing across countries or 
increase financial contagion.
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4. It is important to distinguish amongst different 
types of capital flows. FDI and equity portfolio 
investment lead to increased international risk 
sharing and tend to be stabilizing. In contrast, 
credit flows, which are not always conducive 
to efficient risk sharing, have the potential to 
be destabilizing. This implies that current bi-
ases in favor of debt financing over equity fi-
nancing should be reconsidered. 
5. The bulk of global capital flows are intermedi-
ated through cross-border banking channels. 
Effective regulation of cross-border banking is 
essential for domestic and global financial sta-
bility in a highly financially-integrated world 
economy.
6. The organizational and financial structure of 
global banks are important for the buildup 
and transmission of imbalances and should 
therefore require careful regulatory attention. 
A lesson from the experiences of different 
countries during the global financial crisis is 
that banks that are funded by stable depos-
its tend to pose fewer risks. Banks that rely 
on short-term wholesale funding represent a 
greater risk, irrespective of whether they are 
domestically-owned or branches/subsidiaries 
of foreign banks. 
7. A system of globally-enforced financial regu-
lation combined with global monetary policy 
coordination can in principle reduce distor-
tions sufficiently to allow countries to reap the 
benefits of capital flows while limiting risks to 
stability. However, political realities imply that 
multilateral discussions of banking regulation 
tend to resemble trade negotiations more than 
rational mechanism design. They imply that 
monetary policy tends to be conducted with 
domestic imperatives rather than global im-
peratives in mind.
8. The incremental liberalization of capital flows 
in the pursuit of the ideal of the frictionless 
First Best outcome has not worked as ad-
vertised. Instead it has given rise to serious 
economic and financial instabilities, due pri-
marily to the procyclical nature of cross-bor-
der bank-intermediated credit flows. The cri-
sis in the euro area shows that the flaws in the 
incremental First Best approach are not simply 
a result of underdeveloped or inadequate do-
mestic institutions, as traditionally argued in 
the emerging market and developing country 
context.
9. Given the practical difficulties of attaining a 
unified global regulatory framework and effi-
ciently coordinating monetary policies across 
countries, governments would be well advised 
to adopt a Second Best approach to managing 
capital flows. Macro-prudential policies can 
play a key role in this process by imposing ju-
dicious and targeted regulations on banks en-
gaged in cross-border activities. 
10. Macro-prudential policies should operate on 
both the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet, 
as do LTV and DTI caps, and the liability side, 
through devices such as levies on the non-core 
liabilities. They should attempt to influence 
balance sheet management by banks through 
instruments such as countercyclical capital re-
quirements. 
11. While some impediments to capital flows may 
have sound economic justification, in practice 
others may be the result of political economic 
pressures that seek to preserve vested interests 
and resist much-needed domestic policy ad-
justments. To maximize the former and mini-
mize the latter, the introduction of capital-
flow-related restrictions should be clearly and 
explicitly grounded in comprehensive analysis 
and careful reading of the evidence. 
12. For the euro area, which already has institutions 
in place for a common monetary policy within 
its borders, the ideal of the First Best may still 
be attainable through sufficiently robust finan-
cial regulation together with full banking inte-
gration. A banking union with a single regula-
tor with ultimate authority would effectively 
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help cope with both sets of issues. Alternatively, 
national banking systems that are conservative-
ly regulated at the national level—for instance, 
through macro-prudential measures that limit 
banks’ reliance on short-term wholesale fund-
ing—would help moderate capital flows that 
could otherwise exacerbate procyclical behav-
ior and generate risks. But the middle ground 
of fragmented financial systems with unim-
peded capital flows has been shown by recent 
events to be untenable. 
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Appendix A: Subsidiarization
T
here are important sources of variation in 
both the legal form as well as the funding 
model of a foreign-related bank entity. Sub-
sidiarization is a distinction about the legal form of 
the entity—whether it is a domestically incorpo-
rated subsidiary or a branch of the parent bank— 
while the funding model is about the composition 
of the liabilities side of the balance sheet. It is im-
portant to distinguish whether the bank is funded 
mainly from local deposits or is reliant substan-
tially on wholesale funding, either from the parent 
bank or from the wholesale funding market. We 
have already discussed how the procyclicality of 
banking appears to be intimately tied to the fund-
ing structure of the bank. When lending expands 
faster than the core deposits that the bank would 
normally rely upon, it typically migrates to using 
non-core, wholesale funding to finance its lending 
growth. As such, if the foreign-owned banks rely 
on wholesale funding for a substantial part of their 
lending, then procyclicality would be built into 
their balance sheet management.
For instance, foreign-owned banks in Central and 
Eastern Europe took the legal form of subsidiaries. 
While these raised considerable local funding in the 
host economies, a key type of cross-border credit 
flow for these economies was inter-office fund-
ing channeled from their Western European par-
ents. In this way, the operations of foreign-owned 
banks enabled a faster rate of credit growth than 
would otherwise have been possible. Conversely, 
fast repatriation of funding by the parent at the 
height of the crisis could create a credit crunch and 
endanger financial stability in the host country. The 
decision taken by a major foreign bank to contract 
lending in the host country leads to a slow-down 
in economic activity in the host country, which in 
turn may affect the decision of others foreign lend-
ers, implying that the host country economy may 
find its funding abruptly cut off. Hence, in such a 
situation, there is a clear externality and a need for 
international cooperation. 
As noted by the BIS (2010) report, many (non-
Spanish) European banks use a centralized fund-
ing model in which U.S. dollar funds are deployed 
globally through a centralized portfolio-allocation 
decision. Some of the funds raised will thus flow 
to Europe, Asia, and Latin America where global 
banks are active local lenders. At the margin, the 
shadow value of bank funding will be equalized 
across regions through the portfolio decisions 
of the global banks, so that global banks become 
carriers of dollar liquidity across borders.45 How-
ever, the BIS report also notes that Spanish banks 
have pursued an “arm’s length” approach with re-
gard to managing their subsidiaries.46 The fact that 
foreign-owned banks in Latin America have been 
owned by Spanish parents has translated into a 
funding strategy in which most of the funding has 
been domestic (local) deposit funding, backed up 
by more stringent local regulation than in many 
advanced economies. In particular, the subsidiar-
ies of Santander and BBVA are among the most 
important banks in the region. 
Nevertheless, the large presence of Spanish banks 
has also been a source of concern for Latin Ameri-
can policy makers on the exposure of the banking 
45  Cetorelli and Goldberg (2009, 2010) provide extensive evidence that internal capital markets serve to reallocate funding within global banking 
organizations.
46 BIS 2010 report by the CGFS on the funding model of global banks.
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system to the financial crisis in Europe. The “arm’s 
length subsidization model” did not prevent Latin 
America from suffering a decline in foreign lend-
ing, although it was smaller than the one observed 
in Asia (Figure 8).47
A recent IADB report (IADB, 2012) contains a de-
tailed analysis of foreign banks in Latin America 
and its exposure to European banks.48 Consider-
ing the sample of the eight largest countries in the 
region, Figure 9 shows the distribution of foreign 
claims across countries.
As can be seen, Spanish banks are the most im-
portant holders of foreign claims of the banking 
system, followed by the United States, which has a 
relevant size in Colombia and Mexico, but below 
the one of Spanish banks. As a consequence, for-
eign claims are quite important and concentrated 
in Spanish banks (Figure 10), reaching about half 
of domestic credit in the case of Peru. Foreign 
banks have been a significant source of financial 
deepening and “bancarization” of important seg-
ments of the population.
However, as already mentioned, most foreign 
claims are in a sense local claims (Figure 11): that 
is local funding in domestic currency, which re-
duces the exposure of Latin American banking 
systems to foreign financing. It is interesting to 
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FIGURE 8: Quarterly Change in Cross-Border Claims (billions U.S. dollars)
Source: Consolidated Banking Statistics (immediate borrower basis), BIS (2012)
47  In this part we consider a subset of Latin American (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) and Asian 
countries (India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand). 
48 The data in tables 9 to 11 were provided by IADB, and completed with data from Asia. More discussion can be found in IADB (2012), chapter 8.
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FIGURE 9: Foreign Claims of Reporting BIS Banks (as of 2011:Q2)
FIGURE 10: Foreign Claims of Reporting BIS Banks as Percentage of Total Bank Credit to Domestic 
Sector (2011Q:2)
Source: Consolidated Banking Statistics inmediate borrower basis BIS.
Source: Consolidated Banking Statistics inmediate borrower basis BIS, and IFS, IMF.
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note that some countries, such as Mexico, which 
has one of the largest levels of foreign claims with 
respect to domestic credit, is also a country where 
international claims make up only about a quarter 
of foreign claims. Therefore, despite the significant 
relevance of foreign banks in terms of credit, they 
are still financed mostly with local funds.
The proportion of local versus international claims 
implies differences in terms of procyclicality of bank-
ing activities. While cross-border flows have signifi-
cant co-movements with global financial conditions, 
and Latin America did not escape this pattern dur-
ing the global financial crisis, local funding provides 
a more stable source of financing. Indeed, while in-
ternational lending fell in most Latin America coun-
tries during the crisis in 2008, in countries like Brazil 
and Chile foreign claims actually increased, indicat-
ing that local funding more than offset the decline in 
cross-border lending (IADB, 2012). 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Uruguay
Argentina
Colombia
Chile
Venezuela
Brazil
Mexico
International claims Local claims
FIGURE 11: Composition of Foreign Claims
Source: Consolidated Banking Statistics inmediate borrower basis BIS.
We can contrast the Latin American case with Asia. 
Figure 12 is the analogue of Figure 9, and com-
pares the foreign claims of BIS reporting country 
banks on Latin American countries (the average 
from previous figures) and Asian countries.
We see that Spanish banks have far less exposure 
to counterparties in Asia, as compared to Latin 
America. Figure 13 is the analogue of Figure 10, 
and gives the percentage of total credit that is tak-
en up by the foreign claims of the BIS-reporting 
banks. Again, we see that the presence of Spanish 
banks is far less visible in Asia as compared to Latin 
America. Overall, in the Latin American banking 
system foreign claims as a share of domestic credit 
are a much larger fraction than in Asian countries.
Finally, Figure 14 is the analogue of Figure 11 that 
compares the breakdown of the foreign claims 
between local claims and international claims as 
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FIGURE 12: Foreign Claims of Reporting BIS Banks (as of 2011:Q2)
FIGURE 13: Foreign Claims of Reporting Central BIS Banks as Percentage of Total Bank Credit to 
Domestic Sector (2011:Q2)
Source: Consolidated Banking Statistics (immediate borrower basis), BIS (2012).
Source: Consolidated Banking Statistics (immediate borrower basis), BIS (2012); IFS 2012
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seen in Asia and Latin America. We see that the 
first two rows of Figure 14 show the greater reli-
ance of Asian countries on international claims 
(red bars) as compared to local claims (blue bars). 
While about sixty percent of foreign claims in Lat-
in America are local, this fraction declines to forty 
percent in Asia.
The evolution of cross-border and foreign claims 
did not prevent a reduction in domestic credit af-
ter the Lehman collapse, but this evidence suggest 
that it was not necessarily triggered by an espe-
cially procyclical behavior on the part of foreign 
banks. Indeed, the recession that ensued in 2009 
came together with a severe reduction in domes-
tic credit, but this was not only due to tightened 
financial conditions on the side of lenders, but also 
a decline in demand for credit.
Still it is possible that in this model of banking based 
on subsidiaries by multinational banks, there may 
still be strong dependence of local banks on the 
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FIGURE 14: Composition of Foreign Claims
Source: Consolidated Banking Statistics (inmediate borrower basis), BIS (2012).
health of the financial system of the parent country. 
Figure 15 shows the case of Chile, which illustrates 
how the local banking system can accommodate, 
over time, increased tensions in foreign funding. 
The figure shows how foreign debt from peripheral 
Europe, which includes Spain, has been declining 
sharply. Indeed, affiliates of foreign banks have re-
duced their lending coming from peripheral Eu-
rope from about fifteen percent in early 2010 to less 
than three percent two years later. There has been 
an important substitution from direct loans from 
peripheral Europe to bond issuances.
This evidence has a number of implications. Most 
importantly, Latin America, a region that has tra-
ditionally been severely affected by international 
financial turbulence, showed unusual resilience 
during the global financial crisis. High levels of 
indebtedness, weak banks, and currency mis-
matches were among the amplifying factors of 
previous bouts of global financial turbulence, es-
pecially in the 1980s and 1990s. This time has been 
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FIGURE 15: External debt of Chilean Banks by Region (% over the total)
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Financial Stability Report, 2012, First semester.
notably different, despite the exposure to Europe-
an banks. 
Macroeconomic policies, in particular fiscal con-
servatism, monetary policy geared to a price stabil-
ity objective, high degrees of exchange rate flexibil-
ity, and sound prudential regulation of the banking 
system, were all factors that help explain that resil-
ience. However, the model of integration with for-
eign banks certainly played a role, especially when 
compared to emerging Europe. Foreign banks that 
want to do retail business and to take deposits need 
to incorporate in the host country as a subsidiary, 
that is, a stand-alone bank rather than as an office. 
This creates a structure of corporate governance that 
is more consistent with local financial stability than 
the case in which branches operate as retail banks 
but still follow the instructions and policies from 
the parent bank. In fact, an important component 
of the regulation governing parent-affiliate banks 
when the latter is a subsidiary usually establishes 
strict limits of deposits that the affiliate can make in 
the parent bank, so the risk of using the local bank 
to fund the parent bank is limited. There may be 
some ways to circumvent the regulation, but when 
the bank is a subsidiary the responsibility is on the 
local management and the local board. In this or-
ganizational structure, the host country potentially 
imports management expertise, the brand of the for-
eign bank, and other features associated with mul-
tinational banks without necessarily suffering from 
financial contagion in the case of a crisis in the par-
ent bank’s economy. On the other hand, and almost 
by definition, having subsidiaries relying mostly on 
local funding and ring fencing their capital is syn-
onymous with more financial market segmentation 
and hampers international movements of capital at 
times when they could be beneficial, while branches 
allow a smoother and potentially more efficient al-
location of liquidity internationally.
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Appendix B: On Europe
T
he euro area crisis is sometimes portrayed 
purely as a sovereign debt crisis that is due to 
prolonged fiscal profligacy. While this may be 
true for Greece, Portugal, and Italy, the facts sug-
gest a different cause for Ireland and Spain. Figure 
16 shows the government budget balance of Ire-
land, Spain and Germany, together with the aver-
age budget balance for the countries in the euro 
area as a whole up to 2006. 
The picture painted is of countries witnessing rap-
idly improving budget balances, with Ireland and 
Spain moving into budget surpluses, and with 
Germany and other euro area countries seeing a 
decline in their budget deficits. By the end of 2006, 
Ireland had a budget surplus of three percent of 
GDP, while Spain has a budget surplus of two per-
cent of GDP. This is hardly consistent with recent 
commentaries emphasizing fiscal profligacy and 
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FIGURE 16: Government Budget Balance and Debt/GDP Ratios of Ireland, Spain and Germany
Source: European Commission, AMECO database.
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chronic budget deficits. Figure 16 also shows the 
debt-to-GDP ratio for Ireland, Spain, and Germa-
ny over the same period. Both Spain and Ireland 
had a debt-ratio that was lower than Germany’s and 
was actually declining over this period. The debt-
to-GDP ratio for Spain was below forty percent at 
the end of 2006, while the debt-to-GDP ratio for 
Ireland was only twenty-five percent and declin-
ing. Before the onset of the crisis, both Ireland and 
Spain had outwardly sound public finances, with 
no hint of the trouble that awaited them. The run-
up to the boom masked severe hidden problems, 
and dangers of systemic risk building up in the 
background were ignored. 
To understand Europe’s current predicament, one 
needs to grasp the role played by the banking sec-
tor in financing the housing bubble. As seen from 
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the experience of Ireland and Spain, the bursting 
of a housing bubble can have very large nega-
tive consequences for public finances. As output 
slumps and economic activity falls during the cri-
sis, both the fall in net receipts and the increased 
expenditures to meet the crisis can lead to very 
rapid deterioration. The country can move from 
what appears to be a very healthy budget surplus 
and negligible debt to very large deficits and bal-
looning debt. 
 
Figure 17 shows that cross-border banking within 
the euro area experienced explosive growth, espe-
cially after around 2003, helping to fuel property 
booms in those countries that were recipients of 
the new cross-border lending. The cross-border li-
abilities of euro area banks denominated in euros 
rose from roughly 1.5 trillion euro to 5.5 trillion 
FIGURE 17: Cross-Border euro-denominated assets and liabilities of euro area banks (Billion Euros) 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Locational Banking Statistics, Table 5A
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euro in the space of nine years from the introduc-
tion of the euro in 1999 to the eve of the crisis in 
2008. The rapid increase in wholesale funding 
highlights the important role played by cross-bor-
der banking flows in fueling the housing bubble in 
Ireland and Spain.
In Spain, the share of construction in GDP rose 
from less than eight percent of GDP at the end of 
the 1990s to 12.3 percent in 2007. Meanwhile, resi-
dential house prices rose roughly three-fold from 
1995 to 2007. Ireland’s housing boom was, if any-
thing, more dramatic than Spain’s. Financing the 
housing booms in Ireland and Spain induced capi-
tal flows through the banking sector. 
The consequences for borrowers in countries that 
underwent property booms, such as Spain and 
Ireland, meant that they were borrowing in in-
creasing amounts from other European banks, as 
shown in Figure 18. 
FIGURE 18: Foreign claims of European BIS-reporting banks on counterparties in Spain and in Ireland
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Claims of European Banks on Counterparties in Ireland
Source: Shin (2012), data from BIS consolidated banking statistics, Table 9D
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Compared to other dimensions of economic in-
tegration within the euro area, cross-border take-
overs in the banking sector remained the exception 
rather than the rule. The introduction of the euro 
meant that “money” (i.e. bank liabilities) was free-
flowing across borders in the euro area, but the as-
set side remained stubbornly mainly local and less 
mobile (though the (high) degree of home bias de-
creased to a larger extent within the euro area than 
in international markets, (see the recent survey of 
Coeurdacier and Rey (2012)). It is this contrast 
between the free-flowing liabilities but localized 
assets of European banks’ balance sheets that has 
been a contributing factor in the European crisis. 
The capital flows that funded the property booms 
in Ireland and Spain were financed through the 
banking sector mainly through wholesale inter-
bank funding. Starting in 2008, the euro area has 
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been subject to major disruptions of cross-border 
capital flows, amounting to a classic “sudden stop” 
well-known in the context of emerging-economy 
currency crises, as for example explained in Mer-
ler and Pisani-Ferry (2012). There has been a sud-
den stop of inflows and a sudden start of outflows, 
leading to a severe financial account reversal. The 
reversal of capital flows associated with the “sud-
den stop” has been compensated by the official 
flows of the ECB’s liquidity operations. The accu-
mulated claims that have built up in the TARGET 
gross settlement system reflect these compensat-
ing official flows, which have mitigated the current 
account adjustments needed to compensate for the 
reversal of capital flows. 
This is in line with the banking model outlined 
above, by which banks in booming economies can 
fuel extra domestic lending by rising cross-border 
FIGURE 19: Accumulated net capital inflows across selected eurozone countries in billions of euro
Source: Figure is taken from Euro-nomics (2011) based on Eurostat data.
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wholesale funding obtained from banks in slower-
growing economies, which is exacerbated in the 
presence of the “European passport” for banking 
activities. While there is an underlying efficiency 
case for such cross-border banking intermedia-
tion, it poses obvious dangers in amplifying unsus-
tainable credit booms, especially in environments 
in which banking regulation is inadequate.
The sudden stop in capital inflows triggered a dia-
bolic loop between sovereign risk and banking 
risk. Banks were considered to be less safe and cut 
back their lending to the real economy. This low-
ered real economic growth and tax revenues for 
the sovereign. Fiscal debt levels became less sus-
tainable and foreign (and domestic) investors cut 
back their funding to sovereigns and banks. In ad-
dition banks need to be recapitalized through pub-
lic funds, which in turn increases sovereign risk 
even further. Figure 20 depicts both diabolic loops. 
FIGURE 20: Diabolic Loop between sovereign 
risk and banking risk 
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The analogies between the European crisis of 2011 
and the emerging economy crises of the 1980s and 
the 1990s also extend to the policy prescriptions, 
both preventive and remedial. Mitigating the risks 
of crises entails an approach to financial regulation 
that has broad macro-prudential goals in sight. It 
is here that an emerging market perspective is es-
pecially useful. 
 
In a boom when credit growth outpaces the pool 
of deposits, other sources of funding must then be 
tapped to fund the increased asset growth of banks 
and other intermediaries. In advanced countries, 
the gap is made up by wholesale bank funding like 
securitized notes and repos. For emerging coun-
tries that operate with open capital markets, the 
growth in bank assets is fueled by short-term funds 
raised in foreign currency, so that the downturn in 
the financial cycle manifests itself as a “twin cri-
sis” in which a banking crisis and currency crisis 
reinforce each other. The Asian financial crisis of 
1997 and the turmoil in global financial markets 
in the autumn of 2008 are glaring instances of this 
vulnerability.
 
With the benefit of hindsight, a more stringent 
system of financial regulation that mitigated the 
lending booms in Ireland and Spain would have 
been appropriate. In the absence of other impedi-
ments to the free flow of capital through the bank-
ing sector, more stringent checks on credit growth 
through direct administrative measures may have 
been useful to slow credit growth. The system of 
LTV (loan-to-value) and DTI (debt-to-income) 
caps that are used by several emerging economies 
on residential bank lending (for example by the 
Korean banking authorities) comes to mind as an 
example of an administrative arrangement that 
can be applied on top of other prudential require-
ment on banks. 
European Banks and their involvement in 
Global Financial Flows
European banks, including U.K. banks, were spe-
cial, as they were major players in the global fi-
nancial flows. They raised funds in dollars and 
invested them worldwide including in toxic U.S. 
papers. Most of the funding was less stable whole-
sale funding, invested partly in assets generated by 
shadow bank institutions.
The intermediation activities of European banks 
have been important in driving two-way gross 
flows into and out of the United States (see Shin 
(2012)). Until 2011, around eighty percent of the 
assets held by prime money market funds in the 
United States were the obligations of banks (and 
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fifty percent of the assets held were the obliga-
tions of European banks). As such, money market 
funds in the United States play the role of the base 
of the shadow banking system, in which wholesale 
funding is recycled to U.S. borrowers via the bal-
ance sheet capacity of banks, especially European 
banks. 
FIGURE 21: European banks in the U.S. shadow 
banking system
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Although European banks’ presence in the do-
mestic U.S. commercial banking sector is small, its 
impact on overall credit conditions looms much 
larger through the shadow banking system. The 
role of European global banks in determining U.S. 
financial conditions highlights the importance of 
tracking gross capital flows in influencing credit 
conditions, as emphasized recently by Borio and 
Disyatat (2011). In Figure 21 the large gross flows 
driven by European banks net out and are not re-
flected in the current account that tracks only the 
net flows. Since the euro area has a roughly bal-
anced current account while the U.K. is actually a 
deficit country, its collective net capital flows vis-
à-vis the United States do not reflect the influence 
of its banks in setting overall credit conditions in 
the U.S.
More research is needed in order to answer two 
key questions. Why was it Europe that saw such 
rapid increases in banking capacity, and why did 
European (and not U.S.) banks expand interme-
diation between U.S. borrowers and savers? Two 
likely elements of the answer to both questions lie 
in the regulatory environment in Europe and the 
advent of the euro. The European Union was the 
jurisdiction that applied Basel II regulations more 
quickly, while the rapid growth of cross-border 
banking within the euro area after the advent of 
the euro in 1999 provided fertile conditions for 
scaling up the European banking sector. In con-
trast, Basel II was implemented more slowly in the 
U.S. and a cap on leverage was maintained (at least 
in the regulated banking sector; U.S. investment 
banks were of course exempt, as the sky high lever-
age ratios of Lehman, among others, exemplified).
 
The growing role of European banks in the U.S. 
financial system created a deep financial link be-
tween the U.S. and European financial systems, 
which has been a central feature of the crisis. In 
particular, the losses taken by European banks 
on their U.S. holdings were intertwined with the 
weakening of the European financial system and 
the decline in its resilience in the face of adverse 
developments in the European economy.
More precisely, a central transmission channel of 
the global financial crisis (in particular from the 
U.S. to Europe) has been the exposure of Euro-
pean banks to toxic U.S. assets—especially to the 
so-called private-label safe assets, which turned 
out to be not so safe. According to Bernanke et 
al. (2012), “savings glut” economies such as China 
and emerging Asia piled into government bonds, 
pushing their yields downward. This induced more 
advanced economies, such as the euro area and the 
U.K. to invest in higher-yielding securities, in the 
guise of Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) 
or Asset Backed Securities (ABS). 
Acharya and Schnabl (2011) estimate that banks 
around the world manufactured over $1,200 bil-
lion of ‘private-label’ safe assets by selling short-
term Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) via 
conduits to risk-averse investors and investing the 
proceeds primarily in long-term U.S. securities. As 
liquidity in the dollar money markets dried up in 
2007, many banks were unable to roll over these 
ABCP and forced to consolidate their balance 
sheets, with significant losses. 
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Gourinchas et al. (2012) documents a close link 
between the losses countries sustained on their 
external debt portfolio vis-à-vis the U.S. and their 
investments in U.S. corporate ABS and in ABCPs. 
They illustrate the positive correlation between the 
share of ABCP conduits in countries’ U.S. debt po-
sitions as of 2007 and the rate of losses on their 
U.S. debt portfolios between 2007Q4 and 2008Q4. 
Moreover, there is a strong link between the geo-
graphical distribution of losses and the share of 
the various areas in total ABCP holdings. The euro 
area ended up holding forty percent of total out-
standing ABCP and as a result saw a massive de-
cline in the value of its external debt to the tune of 
fifty-four percent of total losses. The U.K., which 
held sixteen percent of the total stock of ABCP, 
bore twenty-one percent of total losses.
FIGURE 22: Holdings of U.S. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (2007 end year) 
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Source: Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler (2012) using Acharya and Schnabl (2011) data for ABCP exposure.
Notes: ABCP holdings expressed as a fraction of total ABCP outstanding and share of losses in total losses on debt claims between 2007Q4-and 
2008Q4 vis-a-vis the United States.
Banks were also exposed through their holdings of 
longer-term asset backed securities (ABS), which 
figured heavily in the cross-border portfolios of a 
number of advanced economies. Just as in the case 
of ABCPs, there is a positive correlation between 
initial exposure to ABS and subsequent losses on 
the debt portfolio.
The 2007 liquidity crisis is also visible in the strong 
positive correlation between measures of dollar 
shortages in banking systems developed at the BIS 
by Von Peter and McGuire (2011) and the pro-
pensity of those systems to set up ABCP conduits. 
Those dollar shortage measures reflect (approxi-
mate) maturity mismatches between dollar assets 
(long term) and dollar liabilities (short term) for 
non-U.S. banks. They are constructed by assuming 
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FIGURE 23: Holdings of U.S. Asset-Backed Securities (2007 end year) as a fraction of total ABS 
outstanding and share of losses in total losses on debt claims between 2007Q4-and 2008Q4 vis-
a-vis the United States. A negative loss is a gain on external debt claims vis –a-vis the U.S.
Source: Gourinchas, Rey, and Truempler (2012)
that net interbank borrowing in dollars, net bor-
rowing on the FX swap markets in dollars (which 
the authors back out from the balance sheet iden-
tity assuming no open positions in FX), dollar bor-
rowing from official monetary authorities, as well 
as liabilities to non-banks, are all short term. The 
difference between those short-term dollar liabili-
ties and the longer-term dollar assets is by defini-
tion the dollar funding gap or dollar shortage of 
a country banking system. There is a clear corre-
lation, as shown in Figure 24 between these ap-
proximate measures of dollar shortages and ABCP 
conduits (except for Switzerland).
Ad hoc U.S. dollar bilateral swap lines of the Fed 
with other central banks (in particular the ECB) 
were put into place to assuage this problem. 
It has been pointed out (see Philippon and Resheff 
(2009)) that the two main periods of deregulation 
in the banking system (in the 1920s and in the 
2000s) have been followed by the two main crises 
of the financial system. Figure 25, taken from Gou-
rinchas et al (2012), illustrates this view. It shows 
that valuation losses on the external debt portfolios 
of countries vis-a-vis the U.S. correlates positively 
with indicators of the “quality” of the regulatory 
environment. These indicators should probably be 
better understood as indicators of market friendli-
ness or tolerance for unfettered financial innova-
tion. Countries with more liberalized credit mar-
kets tend to suffer larger valuation losses on their 
external portfolio. This finding is consistent with 
recent research by Giannone et al. (2011) show-
ing that the severity of the crisis was strongly and 
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FIGURE 24: The figure reports the upper limit of the dollar shortage measures constructed at the 
group level together with ABCP exposure data at the country level
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Source: Gourinchas, Rey, and Truempler (2012) using McGuire and von Peter (2009) for the dollar shortage measures, and Acharya and Schnabl 
(2010) for ABCP exposure. Units: ABCP exposure: 100mil U.S. dollars; U.S. dollar shortage: billions of U.S. dollars.
robustly positively-related to the degree of liberal-
ization in credit markets, as measured by the same 
indicators or “regulatory quality.”
In summary, the international transmission of the 
2008 crisis vividly illustrates the importance of un-
derstanding patterns in gross international capital 
flows and in particular gross banking flows. It was 
those countries with the largest gross exposures to 
the ABS/ABCP markets that suffered the biggest 
losses on their debt holdings, rather than those 
countries running the largest current account 
surpluses. More generally, the implications of 
capital flows for financial stability and macroeco-
nomic performance can only be fully understood 
by keeping track of the complete matrix of gross 
cross-border capital flows in terms of geographical 
and sectoral positions. Current accounts of defi-
cits of surpluses, linked to net capital flows, miss 
important dimensions of the financial fragility of 
countries: countries’ entire external balance sheets 
should be scrutinized. 
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FIGURE 25: Regulatory environment and U.S. debt asset valuation losses, by country. 
Note: The figure reports the index of regulatory quality from Kaufmann et al. (2010), together with valuation losses (+) or gains (−) on U.S. debt 
assets, expressed in billions of U.S. dollars, as calculated by Gourinchas, Rey, and Truempler (2012)
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